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INTRODUCTION
As the cost of health care in the United States continues to rise,
consumer advocates and politicians push for more extreme and
creative measures to keep prices down. A significant factor in
health care costs is the price of pharmaceuticals still under patent,
so it is not surprising that this has become a particularly tempting
target. It has been widely reported that U.S. consumers pay more
(in some cases significantly more) for patented pharmaceuticals1
1
In the debate over drug prices, advocates for greater access to affordable drugs
generally exclude pharmaceuticals no longer under patent and those that can be obtained
without a prescription because they tend to be more competitively priced due to the
existence of either generic equivalents or acceptable alternatives. In fact, it has been
reported that U.S. generic and over-the-counter pharmaceutical prices are actually lower
than most other industrialized countries. See Patricia Danzon & Michael Furukawa,
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than consumers in other industrialized nations.2 If consumers in
the U.S. could import pharmaceuticals purchased at lower foreign
prices, advocates argue, the price savings could be enormous.3
Representatives and supporters of the branded pharmaceutical
companies counter that importation is merely a short-term solution
that will harm medical innovation in the long run.4
To date, legal, regulatory, and safety issues have prevented
large-scale importation. However, the groundswell of support for
cheaper pharmaceuticals is slowly chipping away at the obstacles.
Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.521v1?ck=nck (Oct. 29,
2003).
2
See, e.g., William Neikirk, Stakes Rise in Drug Import Fight, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29,
2004, at 10 (“Because Canada has a nationwide health system with price controls,
prescription drugs sold north of the border are 30 percent to 80 percent cheaper than in
the U.S., depending on the drug.”); Editorial, End Drug Import Hysteria, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2004, at B12 (“It’s no accident that Americans still pay 38% more for similar
prescription drugs than Canadians, 45% more than the French and 48% more than
Italians.”).
3
See, e.g., Examining the Implications of Drug Importation: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Senator Charles
Grassley) (“Legalizing the importation of prescription drugs through a highly regulated
system overseen by FDA will stem the tide of unregulated pharmaceuticals coming into
the U.S. and create a safe and effective system for obtaining low-cost prescription
drugs.”).
4
See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers (“PhRMA”), Imports Carry
Risks (Aug. 20, 2003) (“[F]oreign governments’ price controls . . . are drying up the
discovery of new medicines in Europe. America now leads the world in discovering new
medicines.”), http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/20.08.2003.832.cfm; U.S.
Senate Repub. Pol’y Comm., Pharmaceutical Price Controls Abroad: An Unfair Trade
Policy 6–7 (Nov. 6, 2003) (“Importation of pharmaceuticals only treats the symptom, not
the cause—it may reduce drug prices temporarily, but it can lead to two devastating
scenarios: first, it would be difficult to impossible for the United States to assure the
safety and efficacy of the imported drugs; and second, indirectly imposing
pharmaceutical price controls in the United States eventually will lead to reduced
spending on R&D and fewer new drugs coming into the market.”), available at
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/hc110603.pdf; John E. Calfee, The High Price of Cheap
Drugs, WKLY. STANDARD, July 21, 2003, at 20 (“[P]rice controls would end up
suppressing innovation here, just as they have done abroad. It is one thing for the
Canadians and Europeans to free-ride on American R&D, but we can’t free-ride on
ourselves.”). The base of public support for this position appears significantly smaller
than that for the importation advocates. See, e.g., Christopher Rowland, Thompson Shifts
on Drug Imports, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 2004, at C1 (noting that pressure from a
number of groups appeared to be eroding the Bush administration’s firm stance against
importation).

CAHOY

626

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:623

Ire over drug prices, in combination with the recent political
environment, suggests that low-priced, imported drugs may
become an option in the near future. Perhaps the most visible
problem to be surmounted is the questionable safety of drugs
purchased from foreign countries.5 Such problems are exacerbated
when purchases are made by individual consumers, who, as a rule,
have little ability to evaluate the quality of what they purchase. An
alternate importation method that may address these concerns has
recently surfaced in the form of bulk purchases by government
entities. Several states and municipalities have requested approval
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to become,
in essence, clearinghouses for local pharmaceutical sales.6 While
this appears to largely solve the problem of unsafe drugs being
imported into the U.S., and thus clears the way for mass
importation, there remains another, more complex barrier: the
threat of patent infringement lawsuits by branded pharmaceutical
companies.
What is the risk of infringement litigation for importation?
Interestingly, it depends on the nature of the importer. Some
actors, like state governments, have limited immunity from such
lawsuits, but utilizing alternative causes of action may circumvent
this protection. If significant state liability exists, could the federal
government step in as a risk-free importer? The rules are in flux,
and the potential downsides are severe. In view of the ambiguity,
perhaps a wholesale change in the law is necessary to eliminate
5

Safety concerns are the primary reason the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
opposes pharmaceutical importation. See Buyer Beware: The Danger of Purchasing
Pharmaceuticals over the Internet: Hearings Before the Perm. Subcomm. on
Investigations, Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Associate
Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, John M. Taylor III) (“FDA remains strongly
concerned about unapproved, imported pharmaceuticals whose safety and effectiveness
cannot be assured because they are outside the legal structure and regulatory resources
provided by Congress.”), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/072204taylor2234.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
6
See id. The State of Vermont has now sued the FDA to compel the agency to permit
state importation. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7–8, State of
Vermont v. Tommy G. Thompson (Aug. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/1092941916_Complaint_For_Declaratory_And_Injunct
ive_Relief.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); Pam Belluck, Vermont Will Sue U.S. for Right
to Import Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A13.
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any possibility of infringement liability. Unfortunately, the extent
to which such a revision would be both legally and economically
viable is also uncertain.
Why is there so much uncertainty regarding the treatment of
such an established intellectual property right when the extensive
jurisprudence surrounding tangible rights seems to produce much
clearer results? The basis appears to be a lingering resistance—in
both the public psyche and the law—to accord full property rights
to intellectual property. While we support the recognition of
property protections for intangibles on paper, at some level
Americans are uncomfortable in granting intellectual property
owners the complete range of powers given to tangible property
owners, particularly in cases of social or political crisis.7 In other
words, the fundamental respect for property over transitory
legislative or judicial policy—full “propertization”—is struggling
to emerge.8 To gauge the progress of the intellectual property
rights equalization, it can be useful to consider extreme contexts
that bring the most difficult issues to the forefront; the drug
importation controversy more than meets this criteria.
To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of these
relevant issues as they relate to pharmaceutical importation.
Constitutional protections for intellectual property have been
considered, but in broad brushes that do not address the issues

7

See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro®: A
Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM.
BUS. L.J. 125, 125–28 (2002) (describing the extreme public reaction to the fact that a
foreign pharmaceutical company held exclusive patent rights to a medicine that was
essential for the effective treatment of anthrax infection).
8
As this Article explains in detail, according legal protection to intellectual property
that is similar to tangible property rights has important consequences. But this is not an
inevitable choice. It could be argued that intellectual property rights should have a lower,
weaker status due to their intangible nature. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property and Free Riding, Stan. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 291 (Aug.
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=582602 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005) (proposing that unauthorized use or “free riding” of intellectual
property should be permitted in all but a few cases due to the irrationality of internalizing
the associated positive externalities). Deciding how much protection society should give
to intellectual property is a fundamental public policy issue that is outside the scope of
this article. However, the analysis herein should help to contextualize the debate.
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unique to this situation.9 Conversely, the specific context of
importation and patents has been narrowly addressed, without the
treatment of more expansive constitutional applications.10 In the
meantime, state and municipal governments are beginning to
implement importation proposals, while Congress has proposed
several pieces of new legislation to facilitate imports.11 Thus,
pharmaceutical importation represents a critical juncture in the
9

See, e.g., Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH
L. REV. 1067, 1140–46 (2001) (discussing state sovereign immunity from takings claims
in the context of patent cases); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of
Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1334–43 (2001)
(assessing the remedies available for state infringement of intellectual property in view of
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for
Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid and How Not
to, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1088–1101 (2001) (reviewing state liability for intellectual
property infringement based on Fourteenth Amendment actions); Eugene Volokh, Essay,
Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1167–69 (2000)
(considering the effect of eminent domain actions for government infringements of
intellectual property); Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When States Steal Ideas:
Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims
Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458–69 (1998)
(arguing that Congress intended to preempt takings claims for intellectual property
infringement); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the
Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 558–65 (1998) (considering the extent to which
federal intellectual property infringements are compensable as a general takings claim);
Shubha Ghosh, Reconciling Property Rights and States’ Rights in the Information Age:
Federalism, the “Sovereign’s Prerogative” and Takings after College Savings, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 17, 33–36 (1999) (discussing a potential constitutional route for pursuing
intellectual property infringement actions against state governments).
10
See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 485–86 (2003) (considering importation in the context of the
FDA’s role in the dissemination of biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation); Daniel
Erlikhman, Jazz Photo and the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: Implications to TRIPs and
International Harmonization of Patent Protection, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 307,
323–31 (2003) (reviewing the law of the U.S., E.U. and Japan with respect to patent
exhaustion); Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents & Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a
Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 820–23 (2001) (discussing international
patent exhaustion in the context of essential medicines); Bryan Baer, Price Controls
through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 109, 113–20 (2001) (discussing United States patent exhaustion in the context of
pharmaceuticals, but with an analysis of U.S. doctrine that predates the most significant
case law). See generally Darren Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International
Harmonization of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445
(1997) (providing a useful outline of the exhaustion doctrines of Europe and Japan).
11
See infra Parts III.B, V.A, respectively.
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continued evolution of intellectual property rights, and this
necessitates a thorough assessment of the issue.
This Article will consider the legal implications of
pharmaceutical importation, focusing primarily on state and federal
liability as a context for the reemergence of constitutional
protections in intellectual property law. Part I discusses the social
and political background for the conflict between patent property
rights and essential medical care. Part II describes the social
policy-based initiatives that would have a significant impact on
established patent rights. Next, Part III investigates the avenues of
recourse available for property owners, with a special focus on the
power of novel approaches that are grounded in basic
constitutional rights. The inability of the legislature to circumvent
constitutional rights is described in Part IV, with a brief note on the
special exception available to the courts. Finally, the Article
provides conclusions regarding the likely impact of this dispute on
the future of intellectual property protection.
I. HIGH PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AS A FUNCTION OF THE
COMPLEX LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The last thirty years of drug discovery have, without question,
produced a multitude of important pharmaceutical treatments that
have increased the quality of life for millions of people; indeed,
many lives have literally been extended through innovative
pharmacology.12 Additionally, drug development has resulted in
lifestyle improvements in areas fundamental to self image and
worth.13 It can even be argued that drug discovery saves health
care dollars as it may reduce the use of more expensive care

12

The impressive record of the pharmaceutical industry is touted by PhRMA, its
primary lobbying group. See generally PHRMA, THE VALUE OF MEDICINES (2001),
available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/value2001/value2001.pdf.
Regardless of one’s position on the economics and ethics of the industry, the benefits the
world has received from drug discovery in the last twenty years are hard to discount.
13
See, e.g., Tim Atkinson, Lifestyle Drug Market Booming, 8 NATURE MED. 909, 909
(2002) (stating that the market for lifestyle drugs is projected to rise to $29 billion by
2007).
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options, such as hospital stays.14 These fruits come at the price of
billions of dollars in research and development spending on the
part of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, as well as
the government.15
Such expenditures are made with the
expectation that they can eventually be recouped. The primary
mechanism by which the profits from those successful drugs can
be maximized is access limitation through patent rights.16 Thus,
patents and pharmaceutical prices are intimately intertwined, and it
is hard to affect one without impacting the other.
A. The Interaction of Patents and Regulation
In the United States, all patents, including those covering
pharmaceutical products, are recognized as personal property
rights17 granted for inventions that meet three primary

14

See, e.g., Frank Lichtenberg, Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People out of
Hospitals?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 388 (1996) (concluding that an increase in 100
prescriptions is associated with 16.3 fewer hospital days, and a $1 increase in
pharmaceutical expenditure is associated with a $3.65 reduction in hospital costs and a
$1.54 increase in ambulatory care).
15
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”),
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN INDUSTRY: 1987–2001, 32–33 (2003)
(noting that pharmaceutical companies in the United States spent almost $13 billion on
research and development in 2000).
16
See id. at 20 (“Patents play a critical role for both the level of R&D investment in
pharmaceuticals and the timing of generic competition.”); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
INT’L TRADE ADMIN, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
INNOVATION xi (2004) [hereinafter ITA REPORT] (“In short, intellectual property
protection is a necessary prerequisite to ensure that innovative companies can continue to
develop new drugs, which will eventually be available on the generic market.”).
Certainly there are other ways a pharmaceutical manufacturer can obtain a competitive
advantage, such as manufacturing skill or the acquisition of initial market share, but
patents are critical in the pharmaceutical industry. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY ch. 3, at 9–10 (2003) (“Participants in the Hearings overwhelmingly expressed
the view that patent rights for pharmaceuticals are essential for brand-name companies to
prevent free riding and recoup their significant investments in research and development
of [new chemical entities].”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
17
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have
the attributes of personal property.”).
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requirements: novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.18 They issue
only after an inventor has convinced the United States Patent &
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) that these three requirements have
been met.19 Subsequently, the issued patents are in force for a term
that expires twenty years after the original filing date.20 During
that time period, the patent owner has the right to exclude all
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing the
inventions into the United States.21
The right to exclude is particularly significant if it covers an
invention that is in great demand, such as an important medical
treatment. The patent owner can use the property right to create a
legal scarcity22 and charge higher prices than one could normally

18

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2000). Actually, the utility requirement applies to only
one type of patent, the aptly named “utility patent.” One can also obtain a plant patent,
see 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000), and design patents, see 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000), but due to
their respective limitations, they are not widely used in the pharmaceutical industry to
protect innovation.
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002).
20
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002). In 1995, the GATT amendments to the Patent Act
changed the method of calculating patent term from seventeen years from issuance of the
patent to twenty years from filing of the patent application. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80
F.3d 1543, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Owners who held patents still in force as of 1995
were given a choice of electing whichever calculation method would give the longest
patent term. Id. at 1547 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994)).
21
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The act of invention itself vests an inventor with a common law or
‘natural’ right to make, use and sell his or her invention absent conflicting patent rights in
others . . . .”). A patent conveys the additional right to exclude others from making,
using, selling or offering to sell the invention. Id. (citing Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling
Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1931)).
22
Intellectual property is not actually scarce in an economic sense, but only in a legal
sense, since it is inherently non–rivalrous—one’s use does not diminish the property
available for another’s use. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS
120 (4th ed. 2004) (1988); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (5th ed.
1998) (1973). However, resources associated with intellectual property may be scarce,
benefiting from efficient allocation. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–80 (1977) (“[T]he property rights literature has
viewed the central problem as one of scarcity, while information has appeared to be an
example of something that can be used without limit. There is, however, a scarcity of
resources that may be employed to use information, and it is that scarcity which generates
the need for a system of property rights in information.”)
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obtain in a perfectly competitive market.23 Some refer to this as
monopoly pricing,24 but market dynamics rarely allow a patent
owner to literally obtain monopoly control of a market.25
Importantly, a patent may cover more than one aspect of a product.
Pharmaceuticals, for example, may be covered by patents on the
basic chemical compound, methods of making the compound,
methods of formulating the compound for effective treatment, and
methods of administering the compound in the treatment of a
disease—in some cases all four aspects may be embodied by a
single product.26 Later-filed patents on ancillary aspects of a
product may have the effect of nominally extending core patents,
assuming they continue to prevent competitors from making the
product.27 Because all of the relevant patents will expire
eventually, these protections give the patent owner a limited
amount of time to recoup research and development expenditures.
The pharmaceutical regulatory regime in the United States adds
a layer of complexity to the intellectual property scheme in an
23
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 122 (“[A] patent enables the inventor of
something valuable to earn profits that exceed the ordinary rate of return on
investment.”).
24
See id.
25
See Edmund Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729–38 (2000) (“Whether or not any
patent or other intellectual property right confers an economic monopoly is an empirical
question, but it seems likely that all trademarks, almost all copyrights, and most patents
are not monopolies.”).
26
For example, a search of the FDA’s on-line record of drug application approvals (the
“electronic orange book”) for the anti-cholesterol drug Lipitor (application no. 020702)
shows that it is covered by ten different patents. See FDA, Electronic Orange Book, at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). But note, this is not
the same as obtaining multiple patents on the same invention; rather the product
encompasses multiple inventions. Technically, each patent claim is, under the law, a
separate invention. See Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Interestingly, some widely-known drug treatments actually have patents only on the most
effective method of using the compound, rather than the compound itself. See General
Accounting Office, NIH-Private Sector Partnership in the Development of Taxol, GAO03-829, 24 (June 2003) (noting that, although the active ingredient of the blockbuster
anti-cancer drug, Taxol (paclitaxel), has not been patented, methods of administration of
the drug have been patented), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03829.pdf. The
compound may be otherwise freely available.
27
See Mark Lemley & Kimberly Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. REV. 63, 81–83 (2004) (describing the process of obtaining multiple patents on
the same pharmaceutical product as “evergreening”).
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attempt to balance the interests of patent owners against the
public’s interest in obtaining generic versions of patented drugs as
soon as possible.28 This effectively results in additional pressure
on branded pharmaceutical companies to quickly obtain maximum
profits. The FDA, the primary regulatory agency that oversees
pharmaceuticals, must approve all new drug applications
(“NDAs”) for marketing in the United States.29 Such applications
require the submission of, inter alia, clinical data sufficient to
show that the drug is “safe and effective” for its intended use.30
Prior to the 1980s, an innovator pharmaceutical company (i.e., the
company that invents a new, often patentable, drug or treatment)
could count on some delay in the filing of competitor (generic)
NDAs following the expiration of the innovator’s patent rights.
This is because generating clinical data takes time,31 and the
process could not be started until the expiration of the patent, as it
would likely involve an infringing “use” of the patented drug or
treatment.32 All of that changed with the passage of the Hatch-

28

See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug
Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 51 (2003). For an excellent overview of the
background behind the enactment of the most important piece of legislation, see
generally Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999).
29
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2003). Technically the requirement is for marketing in interstate
commerce, but few if any drugs would fail to meet that threshold. See also DONALD
BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS §
1.01 (1999).
30
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2003).
31
See Soehnge, supra note 28, at 53–54; Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 187. Although
an “experimental use” exception does exist in patent law, it is very rarely applied. See,
e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This
court has construed both the experimental use and de minimis exceptions very
narrowly.”). Moreover, the courts have determined conclusively that this common lawderived exception does not apply in the case of a competing pharmaceutical company
preparing data for submission to the FDA. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (holding that use of patented
ingredient to perform tests necessary for a competitor to obtain approval of the FDA was
an infringement).
32
See Roche, 733 F.2d 858. Although an “experimental use” exception does exist in
patent law, it is very rarely applied. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–62
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). In particular, the courts have
determined conclusively that this common law-derived exception does not apply in the
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Waxman Act in 1984.33 The new law created a statutory
“experimental use” exception that permitted a generic competitor
to use a patented drug or treatment for the creation of data for
submission to a federal regulatory agency during the term of the
patent, though marketing approval would still be delayed until the
patent expired.34 The Act also streamlined the application process
for generic pharmaceutical applicants by allowing them to file an
abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), which requires only
that an applicant demonstrate the subject drug to be
“bioequivalent” to an existing NDA, as opposed to the more
stringent “safe and effective” standard.35 Additionally, generic
companies were given the ability to challenge all listed patents
before marketing a product by virtue of the Act’s declaration that
the submission of an ANDA constitutes a technical infringement,
thus satisfying the “case and controversy” requirement of the U.S.
courts.36 Taken together, these measures ensure that patent rights
for a valuable pharmaceutical will be strictly limited.37
By possessing a patent’s exclusive rights, pharmaceutical
companies have the ability to take full advantage of the value that
the market places on the drug or treatment in question.38 And
when a broadly-applicable, lifesaving medication is under this

case of a competing pharmaceutical company preparing data for submission to the FDA.
See Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
33
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003)).
34
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2003).
35
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2–3), (c)(3), (j) (2003); BEERS, supra note 29, at § 3.03[A][4].
36
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003); BEERS, supra note 29, at § 3.03[B][3];
Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 190 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)).
37
Concerns that patent owners had discovered techniques to game the Hatch-Waxman
provisions led to recent revisions in the law that close a number of loopholes. See
Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117
Stat. 2066, 2448–53 (2003) [hereinafter “Medicare Act”] (restricting an NDA holder’s
ability to prevent ANDA approval through strategic listing of multiple patents).
Although these changes were vigorously challenged by the pharmaceutical industry, the
effect is likely to be quite minor.
38
Although new drugs covered by patents are not necessarily more expensive than
existing treatments, launch prices do tend be higher when new classes of compounds are
introduced. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Price Trends for Prescription Pharmaceuticals:
1995–1999, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/dimassi/dimasi-final.htm
(last updated Oct. 11, 2000).
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control, consumers are willing to pay a high price.39 While some
may see it as gouging,40 others accept that innovator
pharmaceutical companies must fund risky research programs with
the few commercial successes they achieve.41 A widely cited
estimate from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
suggests that each new pharmaceutical has over $800 million in
research and development failure costs to recoup before it is
technically profitable.42 The ability to set the highest price the
market will bear is an incentive that all research-based drug
companies likely use to craft their drug discovery programs.
The price pressures in the U.S. that are created by endogenous
forces would be significant enough, but the national
pharmaceutical market does not exist in a vacuum. There is no
doubt that the economics of the system are greatly exacerbated by
the influence of foreign health care regimes. In fact, the global
market has been a significant factor in pushing the cost of
American health care to the crisis point.

39

See John Carey & Amy Barrett, Drug Prices: What’s Fair?, BUS. WK., Dec. 10,
2001, at 60 (“The nation’s drug bill has been rising at 14% to 18% a year, and for 2001 it
will be between $160 billion and $170 billion, according to private sector estimates.”).
40
See FAMILIES USA, OFF THE CHARTS: PAY, PROFITS AND SPENDING BY DRUG
COMPANIES 10 (2001) (“[I]f meaningful steps are taken to ameliorate fast-growing drug
prices and costs, it is corporate profits; expenditures on marketing, advertising, and
administration; and executive compensation that are more likely to be affected, not R&D
spending.”), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/drugceos.pdf?docID=767 (last visited Jan. 12, 2005). This perception is especially common when the
profits from the sale of the pharmaceutical significantly outstrip the cost of producing and
marketing it.
41
See Henry Grabowski, Politics, Policy and Availability: Patent and New Product
Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV.
7, 9 (2003) (“One of the reasons why R&D is so costly in pharmaceuticals is that most
new drug candidates fail to reach the market.”); PHRMA, WHY DO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
COST SO MUCH . . . AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR MEDICINE 8–9 (2000), available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf (last
visited Jan. 26, 2005).
42
See Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166–68, 180 (2003) (reporting that the
research conducted under the Tufts Center for Drug Development found that research and
development costs are $802 million, and nearly $900 million if post approval research
and development is taken into account).
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B. Differences in International Pharmaceutical Prices Ratchet Up
the Pressure on American Consumers
The patent system’s pressure to obtain monopoly profits for as
long as possible is not unique to the United States; most nations
have a strikingly similar property right incentive system by virtue
of international agreements like the Paris Convention43 and
TRIPs.44 If intellectual property protection was the only factor in
the cost of drugs, prices might still be high in the U.S., but the
burden would likely be spread out a bit more throughout the world
and the veneer of inequity that currently sullies the industry might
not exist.45
However, studies have demonstrated that
pharmaceutical prices in most other industrialized nations are often
significantly less than in the United States, depending on the
drug.46 The reason for this price difference despite the similarity in

43

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
44
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 ,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
45
A recent International Trade Administration study of international pharmaceutical
price controls found that minor differences in intellectual property rights among the
nations studied did not have a significant affect on pricing. See ITA REPORT, supra note
16, at ix.
46
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE
DIFFERENCES xxiii–xxvii (July 2001) (charts demonstrating that U.S. prices for all
categories of pharmaceuticals—innovative, “me too” and generic—and innovative
pharmaceuticals specifically, are significantly higher than in Canada, the UK, Sweden,
France, Spain, Australia and New Zealand), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/study/pbsprices/finalreport; HOUSE MINORITY STAFF REPORT, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING IN VERMONT: AN INTERNATIONAL PRICE
COMPARISON (Nov. 1, 1998) (finding that the average prices that senior citizens in
Vermont must pay for the ten brand name prescription drugs that have the highest dollar
sales to the elderly in the United States are 81% higher than the average prices that
Canadian consumers must pay and 112% higher than the average prices that Mexican
consumers must pay), available at http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/international.asp;
Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 1, exh. 4 (chart demonstrating that the pharmaceutical
prices for on-patent brand name drugs in many other industrialized nations are
significantly less than in the United States); ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 11–15 (stating
that prices for particular patented drugs in nine OECD countries were only 33–59% of the
U.S. price, based on standard units).
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intellectual property protections involves a rather complex set of
factors.
First and foremost, the health care systems of most
industrialized nations are quite different from the United States. In
general, most countries have some sort of nationalized health care
program.47 These programs entail deep government intervention in
all aspects of providing health care services, including staffing
facilities, determining the available level of care, and purchasing
medical supplies like pharmaceuticals.48 This level of involvement
makes government entities powerful negotiators, and in the case of
drugs, has allowed them to set maximum prices.49 Many countries
do this through a system of reimbursement for patient purchases of
drugs, in which a given amount is provided through a national
insurance supplement.50 Often, the reimbursement amount is
linked to a class of drugs rather than each individual treatment, in a
practice known as “reference pricing.”51 Patients are permitted to
pay more, but there is obviously a strong disincentive to choose a
drug that is priced above others in the class (and conversely, a
47

See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (“WHO”), WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000 95–96
(2000), at http://www.who.int/whr2001/2001/archives/2000/en/contents.htm (“Most high
income countries rely heavily on either general taxation or mandated social health
insurance contributions [to finance health care]”).
48
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 17–21 (“Most developed
countries are similar to Australia in that governments, for social welfare and equity
reasons, subsidize the consumption of prescription pharmaceuticals that have been
approved for marketing by regulatory authorities.”).
49
See id. at 21–25; ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 3 (“All OECD governments studied
in this report rely on some form of price controls to manage spending on
pharmaceuticals.”).
50
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 22 (“[M]ost OECD countries
have moved away from [direct price] controls in favor of reimbursement pricing systems.
Under reimbursement pricing systems, public or private pharmaceutical insurers set price
ceilings for subsidized items (where the list of subsidized items is commonly referred to
as a formulary). Insurers agree to cover or reimburse the cost of listed pharmaceuticals
up to the ceiling (reimbursement price). Manufacturers are free to price above the
reimbursement price but the patient usually must pay the difference between the
reimbursement price and the manufacturer’s price.”).
51
See id. at 25–26 (“Under a reference pricing system, reimbursement prices are
commonly set for a group or cluster of similar or identical pharmaceuticals. . . . If the
reference price is set at the level of the lowest-priced item in the group, manufacturers of
the higher priced items may be required to lower their price to the benchmark.”); ITA
REPORT, supra note 16, at 4 (describing the practice and noting that many countries
consider it to be less restrictive than outright price controls).
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strong incentive for pharmaceutical companies to price drugs at the
level at which they will be reimbursed).52 Drug classification and
reimbursement may be determined, in part, by an economic
analysis of the treatment regimen that links the appropriate drug
cost to its benefits in view of existing treatments.53 While this
pricing method could be termed an indirect form of price control,
some governments go further and actually set by law the maximum
price for which a drug or class of drugs may be sold.54 Whether
pricing is set by direct control or reimbursement, a great number of
countries add another powerful factor that elevates this process to
an international level. Instead of setting controls or negotiating in
an isolated context, they use international benchmarking (or
“external reference pricing”), which looks to the prices in certain
countries as an objective measure of reasonableness.55 Often, the
reference formula states that a pharmaceutical’s price must match
the lowest price among several reference nations.56 Taken
together, these techniques along with a few other sporadically used
controls on pricing57 provide a powerful force to keep prices down,
and by all estimates they have been quite effective.58
52

See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 26.
See id. at 22–24. In contrast, doctors in the United States are generally permitted to
prescribe drugs “off label” if they believe effective treatment will be provided. See James
M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (“[P]hysicians may use
legally marketed drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their professional
judgment, will best serve their patients.”). Insurance coverage is often still available. See
id. at 76–77.
54
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29. Perhaps the most
relevant example of a direct price control system is Canada’s. The Canadian
government, through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (“PMPRB”), sets the
maximum price at which patented medicines may be sold to ensure that they are “not
excessive.” See PMPRB, COMPENDIUM OF GUIDELINE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4–6
(Oct. 2003), at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/2004compendium-e21LTW152004-1350.pdf.
55
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29; Patricia Danzon &
Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and
Patents, 3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 191 (2003) (“[E]xternal referencing
is used formally by the Netherlands, Canada, Greece and Italy, among others, and used
informally by many other countries. External referencing is equivalent to fully importing
a foreign price.”).
56
See AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 29.
57
Other methods of influencing drug prices include setting a volume limit on a
particular price (following which the price must be reduced) and limitations on the
53
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An additional factor in pricing is the variation within the
market for pharmaceuticals in different countries. Some drugs that
are in high demand in the United States may not be the preferred
form of treatment in other countries due to physician preferences
or differences in marketing practices.59 As a consequence of
simple supply/demand microeconomics, prices for a specific drug
could be lower in countries with less demand.
Finally, there is the simple difference in the ability of health
care systems and individual patients in various countries to pay for
high-priced drugs. Pharmaceutical companies may take into
account the fact that a certain country—for example, an African
state—has a great need for a drug, but insufficient economic health
to support either government or private purchase in substantial
quantities.60 In such cases, the company may dispense the drug for
little or no profit above cost. Income-related incentives to reduce
prices are likely present in many countries, but the influence of
other factors means that drug prices do not always correlate
perfectly with a nation’s per capita income level.61
The aforementioned pressures on drug prices lead to essentially
two options for research-intensive pharmaceutical companies: (1)
accept lower profits overall or (2) attempt to make up the
difference in a market that does not have the above constraints.
The latter choice seems obvious given the basic industry model.
amount of profit a company may make on sales to a country’s health service per product
or during a particular time period. See ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 5–6.
58
AUSTL’N PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 77–78 (concluding that cost
containment mechanisms are an important factor in international price differences, but
that it is difficult to correlate the particular mechanism to the amount of cost
containment).
59
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 1, exh. 7. A very important difference is the
prohibition on “direct-to-consumer” advertising in many countries. See Geoff Dyer,
Europe Seeks to Calm Nerves over US-Style Drug Advertising, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002,
at 20 (“Ironically, while Europe is moving towards restricting information from
companies, the FDA is considering further relaxation after a number of recent cases
found it was violating freedom of speech.”).
60
See Gautam Naik, Glaxo to Cut Price of AIDS Drug Used in Africa, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 28, 2003, at B3.
61
See Danzon & Towse, supra note 55, at 191–92 (stating that factors such as a
country’s negotiating power may preclude a prefect correlation between per capita
income level and pharmaceutical pricing, because higher prices are often found in poorer
countries).
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The continued vitality of a pharmaceutical company is intimately
tied to its investment in future pharmaceutical innovations because
health care products can face a potentially more truncated lifespan
than other products. In fact, pharmaceutical companies are often
measured as much by their “pipeline” of future drugs as their
current portfolio.62 The lifespan of a drug product is dictated by
the practice of modern medicine, which generally attempts to
incorporate the newest, most effective (and almost always
patented) treatments. Existing treatment regimens will experience
a loss in market share and may even disappear when objectively
better treatments become available.63 Being forced to use a
product that is “second best” on the market is, to some degree,
immoral, so products do not usually remain available on the basis
of a price break from the premium product.64 The pharmaceutical
industry responds to this pressure with aggressive, expensive
research to find the next blockbuster treatment.65
Thus,
pharmaceutical companies have generally undertaken a policy of
maximizing profits in the last free-market health care realm: the
United States.66
62

See, e.g., John Simons, Lilly Goes off Prozac, FORTUNE, Jun. 28, 2004, at 179 (“Lilly
is a bright spot in Big Pharma, widely acknowledged to have the industry’s most
bountiful pipeline of new products.”).
63
An excellent example is provided by the market for gastrointestinal medications
(e.g., heartburn and acid reflux drugs). From the 1970s to the 1990s, acid suppression
medications (H2 receptor antagonists) such as Zantac and Tagamet dominated the
market, but sales were dramatically driven down when more effective proton pump
inhibitor drugs like Prilosec were approved. See Cindy Parks Thomas & Grant Ritter,
Drug Utilization Trends by Therapeutic Class (Aug. 31, 2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/index.htm.
64
Note that we have a belief in American society that denial of treatment based on lack
funds is immoral. Unlike most countries that long ago accepted monetary limitations on
their health care systems, the U.S. continues to try to make everything available to
everyone. Perhaps this is inherently unsustainable. It is, however, a topic for a different
paper.
65
See Robert Franco, Beyond the Blockbuster, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Nov.
2002, at 74 (noting the blockbuster model tends to dictate the strategy of Big Pharma, but
suggesting that a more moderate approach that aims toward slightly less successful drugs
could be more profitable across the board), available at http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=36729&&pageID=2.
66
One could argue that prices in the United States actually reflect the free market price
rather than an attempt to obtain high profits to offset lower profits in other countries. See
ITA REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 (“U.S. prices are undeniably more market-oriented and
suffer from less direct government intervention than is true among its trading
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As a result of the forces acting on drug prices, the chasm
between U.S. prices and those in foreign industrialized nations is
likely to increase each year, particularly in the case of essential
medicines. Prices for these select drugs seem to continuously
spiral upward with no sign of abatement. It has become
abundantly clear that American consumers are no longer content to
bear the majority of financing for pharmaceutical research that
benefits the entire international community. Assuming that the
United States would have little success in convincing other
countries to change their systems in order to pay for a greater share
of the research burden, the only option is to try to control prices in
this country. There are a number of possible avenues for achieving
this goal, but for various reasons, none have been successful in
lowering prices for most Americans.
II. IMPORTATION INITIATIVES AS A POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE
FORM OF PRICE CONTROL
The most direct way of controlling drug costs in the United
States is for the federal government to create and enforce a
national schedule of maximum prices. Legally mandated price
caps already occur to a limited extent with drugs purchased by
federal programs like Medicaid and the Veteran’s
Administration.67 However, as a general matter, a national price
control initiative that would affect private transactions is a rare

partners. . . . U.S. prices [offer] the closest approximation of deregulated prices . . .”).
This notion requires one to accept that pharmaceutical companies will always price to
maximize profits when possible. However, because non-price factors such as political
concerns and public relations are undoubtedly figured in, companies do retain some
flexibility in determining the sales price. Thus, it is not unreasonable to presume that
pharmaceutical manufacturers have raised prices above that which they would normally
charge in reaction to the pressures from countries with price controls.
67
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4401, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388–143 (1990). The law requires drug manufacturers to provide a rebate
based on the average manufacturer price. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/drughmpg.asp? (last modified Sep. 16, 2004). The rebate equals the difference between
the drug manufacturer’s average wholesale price and the best price it offers to other
buyers (other than the federal government), or at least 15.1%. Id.
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event in recent U.S. history,68 one that is politically dangerous to
undertake as it represents the antithesis of a free market,69 and
difficult for a centralized government to set and apply effectively.70
Another price containment method would be to use the purchasing
power of the federal government’s Medicare program (which has a
greater impact than the Medicaid program)71 as a negotiating
sword. This was actually proposed during the last round of
Medicare reforms, but it was ultimately rejected (with specific
language in the Public Law actually prohibiting the federal
government from taking such actions72).73 Private insurance
companies may also have some ability to negotiate pharmaceutical
prices to reduce consumer costs; however, most have chosen
68

See Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
Library of Economics and Liberty, available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). The exception has been in times of
war. Id.
69
Id.
70
See W. David Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1090, 1092 (1971):
An efficient price-control system would reduce inflation but would not: (1)
require a very large bureaucracy, (2) impose heavy compliance costs upon
industry, (3) set prices which would missallocate [sic] resources more than
would the economy in its absence, or (4) set prices so low as materially to
reduce incentives for hard work, innovation, or investment. These are the
characteristic evils of price controls. Price control systems in the past have
exhibited each of these shortcomings, and critics have claimed that they are
inescapable byproducts of any comprehensive scheme of price regulation.
71
The Medicare and Medicaid programs have similar numbers of people enrolled—
each about 40 million. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2004 CMS
STATISTICS 3 (2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/CMSstatistics/2004CMSstat.pdf. However, many of Medicaid’s recipients are children and
young adults, who consume only a small percentage of the nation’s prescription drugs.
See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., A PROFILE OF MEDICAID: CHARTBOOK 2000 12 (2000), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/medicaid/2Tchartbk.pdf.
72
See Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 1860D-11(i), 117 Stat. 2066, 2098 (2003):
Noninterference.—In order to promote competition under this part and in
carrying out this part, the Secretary—
(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and
pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and
(2) may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure [line
up]for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.
73
See Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act, H.R. 3299, 108th Cong. (Oct.
2003).

CAHOY

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION

643

instead to decrease the percentage of prescription drug prices that
are covered for their policy holders (or eliminate prescription plans
altogether).74
The current lack of success in controlling the prices offered in
this country has naturally led to the popular consideration of
directly tapping into discounted foreign prices. While this solution
would, on its face, seem to be as simple as purchasing drugs
abroad and importing75 them into the United States, it has quickly
become apparent that many barriers exist.76
A. Federal Regulatory Barriers Currently Prohibit
Pharmaceutical Importation
The federal agency charged with ensuring the safety of the
nation’s drug supply, the Department of Health and Human
Service (“HHS”), which oversees the FDA, has a considerable
interest in the drug import debate. Understandably, there is
concern when a stream of foreign pharmaceuticals enters into the
United States with less FDA scrutiny than drugs intentionally
produced for the domestic market. Here, HHS’ mandate regarding
safe and effective treatments is applied to both foreign-made or

74

See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Higher Co-Pays May Take Toll on Health, WALL ST. J., May
19, 2004, at D1.
75
When pharmaceuticals are exported from the United States for sale overseas and then
imported back, the practice is technically referred to as “reimportation.” If done without
the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer, the practice is referred to as “parallel
importation.” This Article will not distinguish between these terms, and will use
“importation” as a general term for all three varieties.
76
Importation works only as long as there are drugs to import. It has been noted, for
example, that if drug imports were immediately permitted across the board, the
international market could supply no more than 10–15% of the U.S. drug market. See
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REDUCE U.S. DRUG
SPENDING? 4 (2004) (“Potential savings in the United States would depend on import
volume, which reflects the size of the total drug market in source countries. CBO
estimates that the volume of world supply outside the United States is about twice the
size of the U.S. market. Assuming that volume slippage from outside the United States
would resemble that from source countries within Europe, CBO estimates that the import
volume would be in the range of about 10 percent to 15 percent of the U.S. market.”).
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies have the ability to cut foreign exports of certain
drugs to ensure that countries have no more drugs than necessary to satisfy their own
markets (i.e., not enough to export).
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purchased drugs as well as those produced domestically.77 Also,
no matter what HHS rules specifically address importing drugs, the
FDA still has the power to regulate any marketing activity for
drugs in the U.S.78
Interestingly, the specific question of importing drugs—though
it has garnered the reputation as a recent political issue—has been
debated for some time and addressed to varying degrees in several
legislative undertakings. For example, the safety of imported
pharmaceuticals was a cause for concern as early as the 19th
century, when public pressure regarding impure or adulterated
medicines compelled Congress to pass the Import Drug Act of
1848.79 This law created a system at important U.S. ports for
inspecting medicines for “quality, purity, and fitness for medical
purposes,” as well as to “their value and corresponding identity
called for on the invoice.”80 Although initially under the
jurisdiction of U.S. Customs, the responsibility for scrutinizing
imports eventually was allocated to the FDA where it resides
today.81
More recently, a resurgence of safety concerns in the 1980s
resulted in the passage of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of
1987 (“PDMA”).82 The PDMA is directed to several aspects of
prescription pharmaceutical safety and was a response to
widespread fear over counterfeit or adulterated pharmaceuticals
appearing on the market from foreign countries.83 The most
77

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2003).
See BEERS, supra note 29, § 1.01 (noting that the FDA must approve the marketing
of any “new drug” in interstate commerce); Div. of Imp. Operations & Policy, Food &
Drug Admin., Information on Importation of Drugs, at http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/pipinfo.htm (Apr. 3, 1998).
79
Ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848) (repealed 1953); see also Wesley J. Heath, America’s
First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 175–77 (2004).
80
Heath, supra note 79, at 179.
81
Id.
82
Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1988) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
83
See Robert Angarola & Judith Beach, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act: A
Solution in Search of a Problem?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 21, 21 (1996) (“Congress’
intent in passing this legislation was to avoid what it considered ‘an unacceptable risk
that counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent or expired drugs will be sold to
American consumers.’”).
78
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relevant provision prohibits anyone but the original manufacturer
of a prescription drug from importing or “re-importing” it to the
United States (unless it is required for emergency medical care).84
In the 1990s, concern over pharmaceutical safety began to give
way to public outrage over high prices. This resulted in the
passage of the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000
(“MEDS”), which contains a specific Congressional resolution that
“Americans should be able to purchase medicines at prices that are
comparable to prices for such medicines in other countries.”85
Though it is often lost in recent rhetoric, the four-year-old law
actually creates a specific exception to the PDMA that would allow
for the non-manufacturer importation of pharmaceuticals with
appropriate FDA oversight.86 It requires the HHS Secretary to
“promulgate regulations permitting pharmacists and wholesalers to
import into the United States [products covered by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].”87 However, the Act requires that
safeguards be in place to ensure that imported drugs comply with
the safety and effectiveness requirements of domestic drugs.88
Unfortunately, it does not detail what would be sufficient to
demonstrate a showing of safety and effectiveness short of
satisfying all of the formal requirements of an NDA or an ANDA.
More importantly, the Act has a major limitation on its
implementation. It explicitly states:
This section shall become effective only if the Secretary
demonstrates to the Congress that the implementation of
this section will —
(1) pose no additional risk to the public’s health and safety;
and

84

21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2003).
Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 384).
86
21 U.S.C. § 384(j) (2000) (abrogating the authority of the Secretary to regulate
imports under 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1)); William Davis, The Medicine Equity and Drug
Safety Act of 2000: Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
483, 487–88 (2001).
87
21 U.S.C. § 384(a) (2003).
88
21 U.S.C. § 384(b) (2003).
85
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(2) result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered
products to the American consumer.89
In other words, the HHS Secretary must vouch for the safety
and effectiveness of drugs imported through this procedure.
Although this section of the law was revised in 2003, the
certification provision was left intact.90 To date, both HHS
Secretaries who have held office after the enactment of MEDS
have concluded that no such demonstration can be made.91 This
has obviously frustrated the original proponents of the bill, as well
as advocates of importation; recent legislative initiatives have
attempted to modify this requirement.
Of course, safety concerns are not entirely spurious and care is
required in revising relevant regulatory statutes. If the HHS
Secretary’s prerequisite obligation to investigate and certify safety
is relaxed or eliminated, some other mechanism must be created to
ensure safety, lest a lawless and uncontrollable trade in foreign
drugs emerges. Even without formal HHS inspection of all
imported drugs, the safety of the drugs could be addressed by a
restructuring of the importation system or through the use of an
alternate oversight agency.
The simplest solution is to allow only imports from countries
with pharmaceutical regulatory systems similar to that in the
United States.92 Canada, and the more advanced members of the

89

21 U.S.C. § 384(l) (2003).
See MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 804, 117 Stat. 2066, 2464–65 (2003). Although
the MMA revisions inserted an entirely new § 804, most of the language is identical to
the prior section. It is not clear that all differences were intended to substantively change
the law. For example, in the HHS Secretary’s safety and efficacy voucher, the word
“demonstrates” was changed to “certifies,” but it does not appear to modify the essence
of the requirement. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
91
See Letter from HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson to Sen. James Jeffords (July 9,
2001), http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/thompson/medsact.html (“You and other Senators and
Representatives asked that I reconsider former Secretary Shalala’s decision and make the
determination necessary to implement the MEDS Act. . . . After a thorough review of the
law, FDA has concluded that it would be impossible to ensure that the MEDS Act would
result in no loss of protection for the drugs supplied to the American people.”).
92
See Robert Pinco, Implications of FDA’s Proposal to Include Foreign Marketing
Experience in the Over-the-Counter Drug Review Process, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105,
110–11 (1998) (stating that the countries in Western Europe have sophisticated drug
90
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European Union93 have a reputation of regulatory sophistication
that should satisfy the safety and efficacy requirements of the
United States. This argument is often presented as a counter to the
pharmaceutical industry’s position that imported drugs necessarily
compromise safety.94 Another solution, which could be used in
combination with a controlled-country scheme, is to limit imports
to large, commercial importers who can better guarantee the source
of the drugs purchased overseas. Both of these ideas were
addressed in a comprehensive review of the costs and benefits of
drug importation recently completed by the HHS Task Force on
Drug Importation.95 The Task Force found that the safety
advantages of limiting importation to certain countries with
advanced regulatory systems may not be as promising as would
appear, because those countries have no incentive to ensure the
safety of exports.96 This is particularly true for products that are
merely “transshipped” through a foreign country, never threatening
to impact the health and safety of that country’s citizens.97 On the
other hand, the Task Force found that a safe commercial
importation program is theoretically feasible, though it would
require the commitment of significant additional resources and the
revision of current statutory authority if the federal government

regulatory systems and reviewing the EU Directives that ensure regulatory continuity
among member states).
93
Importantly, although importation proponents often include “European Union”
countries as equivalent in terms of regulatory sophistication, the recent addition of ten
members to the Union has altered that landscape somewhat. See Richard Bernstein,
Change Coming Slowly for New Members of European Union, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2004,
at 10. It may be prudent to consider the regulatory regimes of each member individually
rather than for the Union as a whole.
94
See, e.g., Examining the Implications of Drug Importation, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Senator Byron
Dorgan) (describing importation provisions in Senate Bill S. 2328, and declaring
“commercial importation by pharmacists and wholesalers could only occur from a limited
number of countries—Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and
Switzerland—that have drug regulatory systems comparable to our own.”).
95
DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION,
REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG INFORMATION (2004) [hereinafter HHS REPORT], available
at http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
96
Id. at 60–61 (“[M]ost countries do not have the legal or regulatory tools available to
guarantee the safety , quality, or efficacy of products exported to the U.S.”).
97
Id.
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were to administer it effectively.98 The Task Force determined that
the economic benefits of drug importation could be quite small in
comparison to these costs, potentially less than a percent of current
spending.99
In view of the Task Force’s conclusions regarding the strain on
current federal regulatory resources, perhaps the most provocative
option involves the participation of state governments, which have
the purchasing and police power of a state actor at their disposal.
The entry of these players into the importation game may
significantly modify the playing field. Moreover, the lack of
Congressional action over recent months has spurred other
governmental entities to become involved, and their proposed
programs are not necessarily dependent on a change in the current
federal statute.
B. Importation Proposals by Certain State or Local Governments
Seek to Circumvent or Supplement Federal Legislative Action
Fighting for low priced pharmaceuticals has emerged as a
popular position for both major political parties100 and thus, a large
number of officials at various governmental levels have offered an
opinion. It is easy to argue that opening the borders to drug
imports is a simple way of reducing costs without the political risk
and administrative hassle of imposing U.S. price controls or some
alternative new regulatory measure. In addition, it has the outward
98

Id. at 41–44. The more controlled nature of a commercial importation program
would allow the FDA to maintain a so-called “closed system” of drug distribution, which
is essential for assuring safety. Id. at 41. Conversely, the Task Force concluded that
permitting wide-scale personal importation was likely to lead to preclude the ability to
maintain a safe drug supply. Id. at 44.
99
According to the Task Force, three factors primarily reduce the likelihood of savings:
(1) most of the savings is likely to be captured by commercial importers, (2) thirty
percent of total drug spending is for drugs that cannot be imported, and (3) the supply of
foreign drugs is limited. Id. at 67. Conversely, the Task Force determined that the
negative impact on resources for innovation could be quite large. Id. at 82 (“Our analysis
show that legalizing importation would adversely affect R&D of new drugs, causing
future drug consumers to forego the health benefits associated with innovation.”).
100
Both Republican and Democratic Senators and Representatives have expressed
support for legislation to ease pharmaceutical import restrictions. See, e.g.,
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th Cong.
(2004) (noting co-sponsors such as Trent Lott, John McCain and Edward Kennedy).
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appearance of a free market solution to an unfair price
discrimination scheme (though many would argue with that
characterization).101 The state governments of Minnesota,102
Illinois,103 Wisconsin,104 Vermont,105 New Hampshire,106 and
Iowa,107 together with cities like Springfield108 and Boston,

101

See, e.g., Importation of Prescription Drugs, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Prof. James
Vernon):
[R]eimporting patented pharmaceuticals from outside the United States is not a
free trade issue. This is a common misunderstanding. The rationale for free
trade is based on the doctrine of comparative advantage: where countries
specialize in the production of goods and services for which they are,
comparatively speaking, low-cost producers, and then trade freely with other
countries doing the same thing. . . . But pharmaceutical prices in Canada and
elsewhere are lower because drug prices are regulated in those markets, and not
because those countries have a comparative advantage in the production of
pharmaceuticals . . . .
102
See Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Fact Sheet, Minnesota’s Plan to Access
Affordable Prescription Medicines [hereinafter “Minnesota Plan”] (“In September 2003,
Governor Pawlenty directed the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) to
review the feasibility of importing prescription medicine from Canada. Like Minnesota,
Canadian provinces license and regulate pharmacies in their jurisdictions. As a result of
that review, Minnesota is pursuing a three-phase approach that will allow Minnesotans to
safely purchase low-cost brand name prescription medicine.”), available at
http://www.state.mn.us/mn/externalDocs/Rx/Rx_Fact_sheet_pdf_012804101245_Rxplan
factsheet061704.pdf (last modified June 17, 2004).
103
See State of Ill., Fact Sheet, The Fight for Affordable Prescription Drugs [hereinafter
“Illinois Plan”] (“Illinois is exploring ways to safely import less expensive Canadian
drugs.”), at http://www.affordabledrugs.il.gov/factsheet.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
104
See State of Wis., Prescription Drug Resource Center [hereinafter “Wisconsin
Plan”] (“If the federal government isn’t willing to take on the drug companies and fight
for more affordable prices, states like Wisconsin will have to lead the way.”), at
http://www.drugsavings.wi.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
105
See Vt. Dep’t of Pers., Tackling the Prescription Drug Crisis, at
http://vermontpersonnel.org/htm/prescription.php (last updated Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter
“Vermont Plan”] (“[T]he State of Vermont petitioned the FDA to approve a pilot
program of importation and State of Vermont officials continue to advocate for a change
in the position taken by the federal government.”).
106
See Christopher Rowland, N.H. to Obtain Drugs via Canada, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
10, 2003, at A1 (“New Hampshire will set up a program to import prescription drugs
from Canada . . . to reduce state prescription drug costs even if it means defying the Food
and Drug Administration.”).
107
See Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Iowa, Vilsack Says Iowa Could
Save Millions Purchasing Prescription Drugs from Canada (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.governor.state.ia.us/news/2003/november/november0703_1.html;
Ceci
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Massachusetts,109 Montgomery, Alabama,110 and Los Angeles,
California,111 have proposed drug import plans.
In what is perhaps a reflection of the ambiguity regarding the
legality of drug imports, several of these government entities have
taken only the tentative step of establishing Internet “portals” to
Canadian pharmacy websites.112 These initiatives are promoted
primarily as an information dissemination program, allowing
consumers to make the ultimate choice in purchasing their
drugs.113 Additionally, some states that have proposed much more

Connolly, Iowa Plans to Procure Drugs from Canada; State Joins Growing Group
Seeking Cheaper Medicines Outside U.S., WASH. POST., Sept. 24, 2003, at A2.
108
See Ceci Connolly, Drug Reimportation Plan Saves City $2.5 Million; Apparent
Success in Massachusetts Is Still a Fight in Washington, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at
A3 (“Thanks to the Landrys and 3,200 other city workers who have opted to order their
prescription drugs from a licensed Canadian pharmacy, deficit- plagued Springfield has
saved $2.5 million in the year since it became the first city in the nation to sponsor such a
program.”).
109
See Christopher Rowland, City Launches Program to Buy Imported Drugs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jul. 22, 2004, at A1 (“While the program is open to 14,000 people, city officials
expect only a small fraction to participate because the incentive is small. The city is
waiving copayments for the Canadian option, but it is keeping copayments for domestic
orders at a relatively low $10. Savings for an individual would amount to just $40 a year
over a domestic drug received through the mail.”).
110
See Cameron W. Barr, Montgomery Drug Plan Has Support Despite FDA, WASH.
POST, Jul. 28, 2004, at B1 (“A majority of the Montgomery County Council is on record
supporting a program that would probably involve importing lower-cost prescription
drugs from Canada for county employees and retirees.”).
111
See Lisa Rapaport, City Council Plan Would Buy Prescription Drugs for Los Angeles
Residents, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004, at 1.
112
See, e.g., State of New Hampshire, New Hampshire’s Medicine Cabinet (discussing
various options for obtaining cheaper drugs including importation from Canada, and
containing a link to the Canadian Internet pharmacy, CanadaDrugs.com), available at
http://www.egov.nh.gov/medicine%2Dcabinet/default.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). It
is worth noting that state drug importation websites often include disclaimers disclaiming
liability “with respect to any product offered, or pharmaceutical care provided, by the
pharmacies listed on this website.” See, e.g., State of Minn., Minnesota RxConnect
Online, Legal Information, at http://www.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/portal/mn/jsp/content.do?programid=536902438&agency=Rx (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
113
See, e.g., Wisconsin Plan, supra note 95 (“The goal is to let consumers make an
informed choice among all of the available options—including local pharmacies, lower
price generics available domestically, and safe Canadian pharmacies.”).
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involved import plans view the establishment of an Internet portal
as a first stage.114
A somewhat more powerful category of initiatives includes
those programs that would alter the current system for health care
reimbursements to provide a preference for lower-priced, imported
drugs.115 This is not unlike the cost-control design of many
European health care systems.116 However, state reimbursement
control is likely to have a limited impact due to the relatively small
percentage of the population served by such programs.117
The most aggressive programs actually envision government
importation of pharmaceuticals for their citizens.118 In essence, the
government entity would act as a pharmaceutical wholesaler,
directly selling drugs that are priced at, or only marginally above,
the discounted foreign purchase prices. A primary advantage of
this mechanism is the ability of a state government to utilize its
own health inspection services, such as a state pharmacy board, to
investigate not only the quality of the drugs being imported, but
also the facilities in which they are manufactured and packaged.119
114

See, e.g., Minnesota Plan, supra note 93 (explaining Minnesota’s three-phase
importation plan beginning with a Web portal).
115
See, e.g., City of Boston Meds By Mail, at http://www.cityofboston.gov/publichealth/medsbymail.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (“People who use this program will pay no
co-payment for the medicines from this service. Right now, the program is available only
to employees and retirees enrolled in the Blue Cross Blue Shield health plans.”).
116
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
117
See Rowland, supra note 109.
118
See Minnesota Plan, supra note 102 (“State officials are working with the Minnesota
congressional delegation to acquire statutory authority to allow Minnesota to import
medicine after establishing a reasonable system that provides for the safety of Minnesota
citizens.”).
119
Id. An example of the use of state resources in this fashion is the State of
Minnesota’s recent inspection of Canadian pharmaceutical facilities in support of that
state’s own importation initiatives. See Prescription Drug Importation; Among Pharmacy
Complaints in Minnesota, None Are About Canadian Imports, DRUG WK., Apr. 16, 2004,
at 309 (“Among the problems, their report found that some Canadian pharmacies do not
take complete patient medical histories, do not ask whether patients have had allergic
drug reactions in the past, and do not use child-resistant safety caps on drug containers.”);
Letter from William Hubbard, Assoc. Comm’r of Pol’y and Plan., FDA, to Minn. Gov.
Tim Pawlenty (May 24, 2004) (“While I understand that Minnesota sent inspectors on
pre-announced visits to Canada to ‘inspect’ the Canadian pharmacies that would dispense
these drugs, it has become apparent that your inspectors found numerous deficiencies in
those pharmacies, refused to certify the vast majority, and had doubts even about the few
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One of the most advanced initiatives to date is the I-SaveRx
program developed by the State of Illinois.120 The program
permits residents of member states to obtain discount refills of
more than one hundred different drugs imported from Canada, the
United Kingdom, and Ireland.121 According to the program
website, it “operates under a stringent system of quality controls,”
uses pharmacies that “are inspected and approved by state
regulatory agencies,” and assures its participants that “pharmacies
[used by the program] in other countries follow the same standards
and procedures used by Illinois pharmacies.”122 In addition to
Illinois, the states of Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont
have agreed to the program.123
Despite the advantages in terms of safety and impact, state
involvement in pharmaceutical importation raises a broad range of
problems—foremost is the risk that a state could face tort liability
for the resale of dangerous or defective drugs.124 Opponents of
state importation programs argue that the costs from future
litigation settlements and judgments will offset many gains in cost
savings for state treasuries.125 The likelihood of incurring liability

that you ultimately accepted for your Minnesota RxConnect program.”), at
http://www.fda.gov/importeddrugs/pawlenty0524.html.
120
See I-SaveRx, About I-SaveRx, at http://www.i-saverx.net/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
121
See I-SaveRx, Frequently Asked Questions: General Questions, at http://www.isaverx.net/general.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
122
Id.
123
See I-SaveRx, About I-SaveRx, at http://www.i-saverx.net/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
124
See, e.g., HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 107–08 (reviewing the potential for states
and municipalities to face liability for drug importation, assuming the waiver of
sovereign immunity for such suits); Gloria Gonzalez, Governments’ Immunity to Drug
Injury Lawsuits Questioned, BUS. INS., Jun. 14, 2004, at 10.
125
See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Importing Liability, at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_issues/state_issues/drug_importation.htm (Apr. 22, 2004) (“With the average
American filling 10 prescriptions per year and the last U.S. Census counting Wisconsin’s
population at more than 5 million, liability awards will swiftly wipe out any anticipated
‘savings,’ leaving taxpayers digging deep in their pockets to pay for more drug-induced
claims.”).

CAHOY

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION

653

may be enhanced because unauthorized pharmaceutical imports
violate federal laws meant to ensure drug safety and efficacy.126
Throughout this extensive drug import dialog, with respective
camps debating issues like drug safety and accessibility, hardly a
word has been uttered regarding the property rights of the
companies producing the drugs.127
Perhaps the lack of
conversation is partly because the American public is unlikely to
sympathize with the patent owner. However, even those who try
to anticipate the pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to thwart
importation almost never mention patents.128 It appears that the
very idea that an intellectual property right could stand in the way
of a health care crisis remedy is difficult to conceive.129 That
patents should be accorded the blockade powers of tangible
property seems somehow novel.
In contrast, the relevant law indicates that the intellectual
property rights at play in the import debate are quite powerful, as
well as complex. This is especially true if the full property
protections mandated by the U.S. Constitution are applied. An
analysis of precisely what property rights exist and how they will
affect the various parties who may be involved in drug imports is
necessary as a predicate to predictions on the future of property
recognition.

126

See Gonzalez, supra note 124 (“Legal experts, though, say the liability protection the
governments are counting on may not withstand legal challenges, because reimportation
is illegal.”).
127
But see HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 92–95 (providing a broad overview of
intellectual property obstacles to importation, though with little substantive analysis).
128
For example, although pharmaceutical importation has been a legislative issue since
at least the MEDS Act (see supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text), it was not until
2004 that a bill was introduced that addressed the patent issues involved in importation
(see infra notes 378–81).
129
See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 7, at 125–28 (describing the public outrage upon finding
that a patent right could indeed restrict access to a drug needed during a health care
crisis).
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III. PROPERTY BARRIERS TO IMPORTING PHARMACEUTICALS
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE PATENT OWNER
Each type of intellectual property has associated with it a
slightly different set of exclusions; to know whether a property
right’s borders have been transgressed requires an appreciation of
these specific characteristics.130 In the case of U.S. patents, one
who without authorization makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or
imports into this country the invention covered by the patent is
deemed an infringer.131
This is quite far-reaching.
If a
pharmaceutical company owns a patent that covers the basic
composition of a drug or its primary medical use, it may essentially
prevent others from doing anything with the compound that would
undercut the company’s limited period of exclusivity.132 Because
there is essentially no “fair use” defense in patent law, the right
extends to activities that are seemingly not in direct conflict with
the patent holder’s pecuniary interests, such as academic
research.133 A so-called “research exemption” exists for those in
130

This can be better understood if one imagines an object covered by patent, copyright,
and trademark protection. One infringes the patent if, without authorization, one “uses”
the invention embodied in the object (see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003)), but infringes the
copyright only if the use constitutes a public performance or display (see 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2003)) of copyrighted expression, and infringes the trademark only if the use of a mark
creates a likelihood of confusion or dilutes the owner’s mark (see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125 (2003)). One act may infringe all three, some, or none of the rights.
131
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
132
See, e.g., John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent
Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 449–53 (1997) (noting that
broad patents are common in fields like biotechnology, but arguing that the “follow-on”
innovator must be protected). It has been noted that there is an economic rationale for
allowing a patentee to exclude a field of subsequent innovation with a strong initial patent
right. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990) (describing Edmund Kitch’s “prospect
theory” of patent rights).
133
In the context of patents, the closest equivalent to “fair use” is experimental use,
which has been so narrowly construed as to be essentially hypothetical. See Madey v.
Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003)
(finding that Duke University’s use of a patented laser for academic research did not
qualify because “regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged
infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and
strictly limited experimental use defense.”).
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the process of submitting applications to a U.S. regulatory agency
(such as an ANDA),134 but it is extremely narrow.
While this would seem to confer oppressively far-reaching
power on those who own patents, there is an important limitation
that curbs such control. After a patent owner has made an
unconditioned sale135 of an article covered by the patent right, the
patentee’s power over that article is deemed “exhausted.”136 In
particular, the purchaser cannot be restrained in his or her use or
disposal of that particular article (unless substantial reconstruction
would have the effect of creating a new article).137 The idea is that
a patent owner has received compensation for the rights attached to
the article as a consequence of the sale, and allowing the patentee
to tax continued use would constitute double compensation.138
Although a straightforward reading of the patent statute makes no
reference to the exhaustion doctrine, it is well established in

134
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003); Apotex v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (“The Act permitted a company wishing to develop a generic version of an
approved drug to manufacture and use the drug for development purposes without
infringing any patent claiming the approved drug.”).
135
The sale of a patented article with certain conditions may transform the sale into a
license, eliminating the application of the exhaustion doctrine. See Daniel R. Cahoy,
Oasis or Mirage: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of Patent and Copyright
Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135, 155 (2003) (noting that even a label placed on
an article may be sufficient to create a patent license) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
136
See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“[S]ale of [a
patented article] exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not
thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.”); Intel
Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The law is well
settled that an authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach
of the patent.”).
137
See FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
138
See Margreth Barrett, The United States’ Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of
Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911, 913–14 (2000). Subsequent sales are presumed
to be outside of the inventor’s view. Id. at 913.
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common law patent jurisprudence139 and is reflected in the law
related to other intellectual property rights.140
The application of the patent exhaustion principle in the world
of pharmaceuticals is relatively clear: once a drug covered by one
or more patents is sold, the pharmaceutical company has no power
to limit further use or resale of that drug by the purchaser. The
purchaser of a bottle of pills, for example, should be able to use or
dispose of them without an accounting to the patent owner (so long
as no other state or federal laws are violated). This would seem to
resolve the conflict of patent rights and importation.
Unfortunately, this description is incomplete. The concept of
exhaustion depends upon an authorized sale under the patent
owner’s rights, and in the global context, it is difficult to determine
the appropriate borders for that right. Surprisingly, the situation
has not become much clearer in recent years. Indeed, the
limitations of patent exhaustion are one of the most contentious
issues for the international legal community to solve, due in no
small part to the effect on the pharmaceutical market.

139

Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1864) (“[W]hen a patentee has himself
constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to
construct and use and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the right,
he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest
whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized to be constructed and operated.”);
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646 (1846).
140
Specifically, the exhaustion doctrine also restrains the power of copyright and
trademark owners. It is more commonly referred to as the “first sale doctrine” in those
contexts, but its operation is essentially the same. The sale of an item containing
copyrighted material conveys to the item’s new owner the right to sell or destroy it, and a
somewhat more limited right to use it. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); Quality King
Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza, 523 U.S. 135, 150–51 (1998) (finding that a provision giving
copyright owners exclusive rights over the importation of copyrighted goods is subject to
the limitations in § 109(a)). Similarly, the authorized sale of an item bearing the
trademark of another prevents the trademark owner from restricting the subsequent use or
sale of the item. See, e.g., Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297,
1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001); Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 303 n.4 (3d Cir.
1998); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). In the
case of copyright law, the first sale doctrine is expressly written into the Copyright Act.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
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A. The United States’ Refusal to Recognize an International
Exhaustion Rule
The issue of intellectual property exhaustion for sales within a
sovereign nation is, for the most part, well settled; a rule similar to
that in the United States is almost uniformly applied among the
industrialized nations.141 However, there are differences with
regard to the treatment of sales that take place outside of the
country in question,142 particularly in the case of patent rights.
While many countries apply a blanket exhaustion rule that
encompasses all sales, regardless of the locale, the U.S. is far from
alone in distinguishing between national and international
exhaustion.143 Some countries even apply a hybrid rule, which
recognizes exhaustion for sales within a particular group of
countries, but not internationally.144 Interestingly, while
141

See, e.g., Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 323–31 (reviewing the patent exhaustion rules
of the U.S., Japan, and the EU, and showing that all have at least a national or regional
exhaustion policy).
142
Is there a difference if the first sale is made in the United States to an exporter for
sale in another country? A distinction may exist if the exporter is bound by express
contract to sell outside the United States. In that case, U.S. rights would not be exhausted
by the sale. See, e.g., Ariz. Cartridge Remanufactures Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 1034, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“In the case of a conditional sale, the purchaser
does not receive the same implied license that the purchaser in an unconditional sale
receives. Thus, where the purchaser of an unconditional sale has every right to repair the
device, the purchaser of a conditional sale does not.”); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F.
Supp. 2d 746, 753 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The exhaustion doctrine only applies where the
sale or license of the patented invention is an unconditional one.”).
143
See Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intell. Prop. (“AIPPI”), International Exhaustion of
Industrial Property Rights, Summary Report, Question Q 156 (Mar. 23–30, 2001)
[hereinafter “AIPPI Report”] (“The following states do not apply a rule of international
exhaustion of patents: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. In contrast, Argentina, Canada,
Singapore and Venezuela do apply a rule of international exhaustion to patents.”),
available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q156/q156-Summary-e.htm; see also Darren E.
Donnelly, Comment, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion
of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 468–84 (1997).
144
See AIPPI Report, supra note 143 (“Some groups [representing member states]
described regional Exhaustion of Patents within the EEA, following the decisions of the
ECJ in Centrapharm v Sterling Drug (C-15/74, 31 October 1974) and Merck v Stephar
(C-187/80, 14 July 1981), as occurring when a product covered by a patent is marketed
within the EEA by the patent owner or with consent.”).
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harmonization of such disparate intellectual property rules has
been a primary goal of several international treaties, intellectual
property exhaustion has so far eluded consensus treatment. In fact,
the relatively recent and comprehensive treaty known as TradeRelated aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (“TRIPs”)
expressly states that it does not address intellectual property
exhaustion, leaving the issue for individual countries to resolve.145
Similarly, regional treaties, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) also tend to skirt the issue,146 even though
one would think the opportunities for consensus are greater when
only two or three parties are negotiating. One exception is the
recent U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (“UAFTA”) which
contains an exhaustion provision, but it may be limited to
contractual restrictions.147 Today, there is no evidence that the
international community is any closer to agreement on this issue.
Thus, a patchwork of exhaustion rules exists across the globe.
The international exhaustion paradigm is typified by the
Canadian scheme, which covers all intellectual property rights in
that country.148 Because Canada is a common law country, its
exhaustion rule is based largely in the decisions of its courts, but
the effect is the same as if enacted by statute.149 If a product
145

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 44, art. 6 (“[N]othing in [TRIPs] shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
146
Lans Noah, NAFTA’s Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 HOUS. L. REV.
1293, 1303 (1997).
147
See U.S.-Australian Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, Art. 17.9, ¶ 4 (“[T]he
exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a
product that results from a patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall
not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory, at least
where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or other means.”),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,2005). The phrase “at
least” may have been added to permit each country to adopt an international exhaustion
rule that could be limited by contract. See infra note 149–151 and accompanying text.
148
See International Exhaustion of Industrial Property Rights, Canadian Group Report,
Report Q 156 [hereinafter Canadian Report], available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q156/gr-q156-Canada-e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005); Erlikhman, supra note
9, at 337–38.
149
Canadian Report, supra note 148, at 48 (“The question of international exhaustion of
I.P. Rights is, with the exception of an express provision in the Canadian Copyright Act,
one which has not been addressed in any of the I.P. legislation in Canada to date and,
accordingly, it has been left to the Canadian courts to seek to develop a body of law
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covered by an intellectual property right, including a patent, is sold
or produced in a foreign country under authorization of the
intellectual property owner, the right to control the product by
virtue of the property right disappears.150 However, it may be
possible for an intellectual property owner to retain some rights if
the foreign sale is restricted by explicit contract (and the importer
is aware of the contract).151 This rather liberal rule creates a
presumption of exhaustion, and is the approach most favored by
developing nations.152
Members of the European Economic Area (“EEA”),153 on the
other hand, are obligated to apply a regional exhaustion rule that
pertains to sales within the member states.154 Countries that would
otherwise have no international exhaustion rule will treat sales
within the EEA as if they occurred within the member state,
regardless of whether the intellectual property owner consented to
EEA-wide marketing.155
Interestingly, proposed European
based in part on the jurisprudence in other common law countries such as the United
Kingdom.”).
150
Id. at 49–50.
151
Id. at 51.
152
See Catalin Cosovanu, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The
Software Sector in Eastern Europe and Other Emerging Markets, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 165,
197 n.104 (2003) (“Moreover, developing countries have generally favored international
exhaustion, while developed countries have been mostly on the side of territorial (i.e.,
either national or regional, e.g., European Union wide) exhaustion.”).
153
The EEA consists of members of the European Union plus other European nations
that wish to have the economic benefits of EU membership without all of the
responsibilities. See Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1994 O.J.
(L 1) 3 [hereinafter EEA Agreement]; see also European Commission, European
Economic Area: Overview, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/eea (last
updated Oct. 2004).
154
See Commission Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal
products for which marketing authorisations have already been granted, COM(2003)839
final at 10 (“[T]he owner of an industrial and commercial property right protected by
Member State legislation may not rely on that legislation to oppose the importation of a
product which has been lawfully placed on the market in another Member State by, or
with the consent of, the proprietor of that right. The right is considered to have been
exhausted once the product has been put on the market somewhere in the Community.”),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0839en01.pdf.
155
See International Exhaustion of Industrial Property Rights, French Group Report,
Report Q 156 [hereinafter French Report], available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q156/gr-q156-France-f.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (noting that France has no
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Community legislation actually appears to take a position against a
broader international exhaustion rule.156
The community
exhaustion rule could be suspended by a licensee’s breach of a
restrictive personal contract (so long as the contract complies with
applicable competition rules).
However, absent a specific
restriction, exhaustion within the EEA is presumed.
While the United States is in line with proponents of
international exhaustion in its legal scheme for copyright and
trademark rights, it is truly on the other end of the spectrum in its
treatment of patent rights. As with Canada, U.S. patent rules are a
consequence of a series of common law decisions rather than an
explicit statutory structure. The leading case is actually the 1890
Supreme Court decision in Boesch v. Graff.157 It concerned
Boesch’s alleged infringement of Graff’s U.S. patent on an
improved lamp burner by importing infringing burners from
Germany.158 Boesch was authorized to manufacture and sell the
burners in Germany, but the U.S. patent owners (who were
assignees of the party that originally owned both the U.S. and
German rights) had not given Boesch permission to import the
burners.159 The Supreme Court determined that a sale authorized
under foreign law had no bearing on the rights of a U.S. patent
owner.160 The importation was deemed infringing.161
While the Boesch decision may seem ancient in the context of
modern intellectual property law, as well as arguably
distinguishable from many of the scenarios likely to occur in
pharmaceutical imports, no other Supreme Court case has touched
so specifically on the exhaustion issue. A smattering of noninternational exhaustion rule, but does practice regional exhaustion as a member of the
EEA).
156
See, e.g., Commission on the European Communities, Amended proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive approximating the legal arrangements for
the protection of inventions by utility model, 2000 O.J. (C 248 E) 56, 66 (“The rights
conferred by a utility model shall, however, extend to acts concerning a product covered
by that utility model which are done after that product has been put on the market outside
the Community by the right-holder or with his consent.”).
157
133 U.S. 697 (1890).
158
Id. at 701–02.
159
Id. at 702.
160
Id. at 702–03.
161
Id. at 709.
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precedential162 lower court cases have addressed the issue, either in
accord with Boesch or distinguishing it on technical grounds,163 but
those rulings were neither disputed nor affirmed at a national
level.164 However, in 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the court authorized to hear all patent appeals and
responsible for articulating national patent rules, decided a case
that brought the scope of patent exhaustion back into the
spotlight.165
In Jazz Photo v. International Trade Commission,166 the
Federal Circuit was primarily concerned with whether patents
owned by Fuji Photo Film Co. covered the concept of single use
cameras, and whether these patents were infringed by Jazz Photo’s
refurbishment and resale of legally purchased Fuji cameras.167
Since most of the cameras had been purchased in the U.S., the
patent rights were exhausted except to the extent that Jazz Photo’s
refurbishment constituted impermissible reconstruction of the
162

When the Federal Circuit became the sole circuit to which one can appeal cases
arising under U.S. patent laws, it adopted as its precedent only the case law of the U.S.
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals announced before
September 30, 1982. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 & n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1982). Thus, the weight of existing patent decisions from all other circuit courts was
instantly reduced to merely persuasive. See generally id. at 1371 (“[N]o body of law
established by any other court [other than the predecessor courts] would appear a suitable
candidate for adoption.”).
163
See, e.g., Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F.
71, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1920) (finding that airplanes manufactured under patent license in
Britain and imported into the United States did not infringe); Griffin v. Keystone
Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285–87 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (sale of patented
composting machines in Italy did not exhaust the U.S. patent); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech
Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 940–41 (D.N.J. 1983) (finding that the
foreign sale of chemical compounds by the patent owner did not exhaust the U.S. patent
right where that right was the subject of an exclusive license to another).
164
See 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.03[2][a][iv] (2001) (noting that “In the United States,
the issue has arisen often with regard to trademark and copyright but relatively rarely
with regard to patents.”).
165
The Federal Circuit is the only circuit court empowered to hear cases arising under
U.S. patent laws. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (1982).
166
264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 950 (2002).
167
Id. at 1098–99. The ITC is a named defendant because the case involved Fuji’s
request that the agency restrict importation of Jazz Photo’s refurbished cameras under 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
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patented device.168 Making this assessment consumed most of the
court’s opinion. However, in a short but powerful passage, the
court noted that Jazz Photo purchased some of the cameras at issue
outside of the United States, and found that these would infringe
regardless of whether reconstruction took place:
United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of
foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of the first
sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred
under the United States patent. See Boesch v. Graff, 133
U.S. 697, 701-703 (1890) (a lawful foreign purchase does
not obviate the need for license from the United States
patentee before importation into and sale in the United
States). Our decision applies only to LFFPs for which the
United States patent right has been exhausted by first sale
in the United States. Imported LFFPs of solely foreign
provenance are not immunized from infringement of
United States patents by the nature of their
refurbishment.169
By invoking such a broad articulation of the exhaustion rule,
the court essentially foreclosed the argument that an overseas sale
of a product under authority of the owner of U.S. patent rights
could be re-imported without running afoul of the U.S. patent.170
Some immediately proclaimed the decision in Jazz Photo to be
an aberration and a fundamental misinterpretation of existing
precedent.171 Others argued that the decision was contrary to the
principle underlying the exhaustion rule and bad public policy as
well, particularly in view of its negative effect on pharmaceutical
importation.172 But there are also important economic and public
168

Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1105.
170
See id.
171
See Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 337.
172
See James Love & Sean Flynn, Legal and Policy Issues Concerning Parallel Trade
(aka Re-Importation) of Pharmaceutical Drugs in the United States 1 (Mar. 31, 2004)
(discussing the decision and stating “To authorize parallel importation of medicines,
legislation should make it clear that U.S. patent rights are exhausted by the first sale of
the patented product by the patent owner, or by a party who is authorized to use the
patent. Specifically, it needs to be clear that the United States has elected the rule of
169
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policy reasons in support of the decision. For example, it could be
demonstrated that a national exhaustion rule would permit more
efficient pharmaceutical pricing through international price
discrimination.173 Additionally, given that exhaustion is premised
on the idea that a patent owner is due payment for the use of the
right only once, the fact that the “right” may be different from
country to country (or even non-existent in some cases)174 is
important.175 It is illogical to eliminate a right in one country
based on a payment for a qualitatively different right in another
country, particularly in view of the fact that such rights must be
individually secured from each sovereign nation.176 Deciding
whether Jazz Photo articulates the best rule clearly depends on
one’s perspective.
An intriguing aspect of Judge Newman’s opinion in Jazz Photo
is that she articulated the national exhaustion rule with such
brevity. One could be forgiven for wondering if the powerful
effect attributed to that one sentence in her opinion has been
inflated or simply misinterpreted. Fortunately, the Federal Circuit
took the opportunity to revisit the issue four years later in an
appeal of a subsequent matter in the same case. In Fuji Photo Film
Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp.,177 the defendant specifically requested
that the Federal Circuit consider whether the earlier opinion

international exhaustion of patent rights.”), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/fsd/love03312004.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); Erlikhman, supra note 10, at 337.
173
See Danzon & Towse, supra note 53, at 201–02 (concluding that price differentiation
“would go a long way towards making drugs that are developed for high income
countries available and affordable in [developing countries], while preserving incentives
for R&D”).
174
For example, the scope of business methods patentable in the United States is much
greater than in countries of the European Union. See Keith Maskus & Eina Wong,
Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
289, 302–303 (2002) (noting the difficulties in comparing the economic effects of
business method patents across countries due to the differences in protection accorded).
175
See John R. Thomas, Patents and Drug Importation, CONG. RES. SERV. REPT.
RL32400 at 7–8 (May 2004). Although agreements like TRIPs set a baseline for patent
rights, there is no “international patent,” and subtle differences exist between each
country’s national patent laws.
176
See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 813 (1998).
177
394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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limited exhaustion to unauthorized foreign sales.178
determined that the rule was not so limited:

The court

The patentee’s authorization of an international first sale
does not affect exhaustion of that patentee’s rights in the
United States. . . . Moreover, Fuji’s foreign sales can never
occur under a United States patent because the United
States patent system does not provide for extraterritorial
effect. . . . In Jazz, therefore, this court expressly limited
first sales under the exhaustion doctrine to those occurring
within the United States.179
Given the fact that the 2001 Jazz Photo decision was denied
certiorari,180 it is not clear that the 2005 decision, which is at most
a clarification of the earlier stated exhaustion principle, is subject
to Supreme Court review or en banc reconsideration by the Federal
Circuit.181 Unless another case arises that provides an opportunity
to revisit the issue, it appears to be unambiguously the law in the
United States that foreign sales will not exhaust U.S. patent rights.
Therefore, unauthorized importation of goods covered by U.S.
patents creates significant liability for all who participate.
B. A Patentee’s Success Using the Traditional Infringement
Litigation Depends on the Defendant
Pharmaceutical companies are experienced at pursuing alleged
infringers in federal court.182 The civil patent infringement system
has the benefit of being relatively established through abundant
case law,183 and predictable due to the existence of a single federal
178

Id. at 1376.
Id.
180
Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 U.S. 950 (2002).
181
The author of the 2005 opinion, Judge Rader, noted his desire to have the original
decision heard en banc. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094,
1094 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001). Now that six judges of the twelve-judge Federal Circuit have
joined in stating a national exhaustion rule, it is unlikely that an en banc review would
change the decision in any case.
182
See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001) (finding that “drug” patent
owners are more likely to engage in litigation than owners of patents in other fields).
183
See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES Tbl. 2.2 (Mar.
2003) (noting that there were 2814 patent cases filed in the U.S. district courts in 2003),
179
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appeals court.184 Many believe that patent owners have an unfair
advantage in the current litigation climate,185 but others have found
that empirical evidence does not support that notion.186 In any
case, the complexity and expense of patent litigation alone can be
enough to dissuade potential infringers.187
Considering the current legal environment with regard to
exhaustion, it is clear that individuals who import pharmaceuticals
face patent infringement liability. One who imports a drug that
was first sold overseas and is covered by composition and/or
formulation patents would infringe both the patent owner’s sale
and import rights.188 Additionally, if a drug is manufactured using
a patented process, the importer is liable for infringement under a
separate provision of the Patent Act, even if the resulting
composition or formulation is not protected.189 However, it is
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies will undertake the political
risk and financial burden of pursing patent infringement lawsuits
against individual importers. Large private businesses that engage
in importation present a more tempting target, and could be
pursued by private litigants much as the federal government
pursues these companies for violating FDA regulations,190 though
it is unclear to what extent this brand of infringement is likely to

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.02.pdf (last visited Jan.
12, 2005).
184
See supra note 165.
185
See Hon. Richard Lin, The Future Role for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Now that it Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (noting
the development of a general perception that the Federal Circuit was pro-patent).
186
See Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 152 (1995); John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
187 (1998).
187
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1502 (2001) (stating that “the median cost of patent litigation to each side is $799,000
through the end of discovery, and $1,503,000 through trial and appeal”).
188
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
189
Id. § 271(g) (2000).
190
See Press Release, FDA, FDA Takes Action Against Companies That Are Importing
Unapproved, Potentially Unsafe Drugs (Sept. 9, 2003) (describing an FDA request to the
Justice Department to file a complaint against RX Depot for facilitating illegal shipments
of prescription pharmaceuticals from foreign countries), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00939.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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occur. Moreover, enforcement of patent infringement judgments
against foreign defendants can be difficult.191
Government pharmaceutical importation plans that envision
direct involvement in bringing patented drugs across international
borders create the greatest risk of litigation, partly because such
importation initiatives are already in place,192 and also because of
the deep pockets of these state actors. In general, a government
entity that engages in importation would violate the same
provisions of the Patent Act as a private infringer. And, even if a
government’s plans merely facilitate import by others, the
government entity may still face infringement liability. Patents
include the right to exclude the acts of parties that induce
infringement.193 All that is required to make such a claim is that a
defendant acted knowingly to induce another and that infringement
actually occurred as a result of that inducement.194 To put it
another way, the defendant must have the “specific intent” to
encourage another’s infringement.195 One look at the state and
municipal websites that direct consumers to Canadian pharmacies
suggest that this would be a fairly easy argument to make in an
infringement suit.196 The rather dramatic result would be liability

191

Because patents are inherently territorial, the enforcement of U.S. judgments
overseas is notoriously thorny. See John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent
Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 90–93 (2000) (“Enforcement of judgments can be an
arduous process even within a single nation and the enforcement of a foreign patent
judgment presents additional tests to ensure fairness and comity in view of the large
amounts of investment at stake.”). International treaties have been proposed to remedy
the situation. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1065, 1065–66 (2002).
192
See supra notes 102–14, 118–20 and accompanying text.
193
35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2004).
194
See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Although not express in the statute, this section requires proof of intent
to induce infringement.”).
195
See id.; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
196
See, e.g., Minnesota RxConnect, at http://www.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/portal/mn/jsp/home.do?agency=Rx (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (home page with button stating “Click
here to order your prescription from Canada.”).
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for all damages resulting from the infringing acts, due to the joint
and several nature of patent torts.197
The liability for infringing a U.S. patent can be extreme,
particularly when the infringement cuts into the profits of a socalled “blockbuster” drug.198 Though patents lack the minimum
statutory damages associated with copyrights,199 they nonetheless
strip an infringer of damages equal to all profits lost as a result of
the infringement.200 In the case of a pharmaceutical with a high
U.S. price, but low foreign price—the situation importation is
intended to address—the measure of damages could simply be the
difference in prices.201 In other words, a government entity may
end up paying for any savings in drug prices through an award in a
patent infringement case. Indeed, if export middlemen take a cut
of the savings as predicted,202 a government entity could actually
end up paying more for imported drugs. Even if a patent owner
cannot establish a lost profits case, a “reasonable royalty” is the
minimum with which an infringer can escape;203 thus, taxpayers
would end up subsidizing the cost of drugs at some level.
Additionally, if the infringement is found to be willful, damages
may be increased up to three times at the discretion of the court.204
197
See CHISUM, supra note 164, § 8:21.03[3][e] (“The owner may also have a remedy
against persons who induce or contribute to infringement by another . . . However,
because such infringers are by long tradition severally as well as jointly liable, they may
be sued separately (that is, they are not necessary parties).”) (citations omitted).
198
See Franco, supra note 65.
199
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000).
200
See State Indus. v Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“To get
lost profits as actual damages, the patent owner must demonstrate that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for the infringement, it would have made the infringer’s
sales.”).
201
Note that this assumes that sales made at the low foreign price would still be made at
the high U.S. price. For essential, maintenance drugs, this may be true, but for lifestyle
drugs, one could argue that at least some percentage of the purchases would not have
been made at the higher price. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185
F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that lost profit damages must be proven only to
a reasonable probability).
202
See, e.g., HHS REPORT, supra note 95, at 67.
203
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)) (noting that the patent damages statute allows for the
recovery of actual damages while providing for a reasonable royalty as an alternative,
lower limit).
204
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
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Injunctive relief is also a possibility,205 though overtly restricting
access to drugs could be a politically dangerous measure for patent
owners to undertake.
While the potential for crushing liability seems to bode ill for
the future of government importation initiatives, there is an
extremely important codicil that must be considered: state
governments currently cannot be sued for patent infringement in
federal court. The Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment absolutely
precludes such suits against states, a fact well established in patent
jurisprudence.206 Congress has of course abrogated this broad
constitutional immunity in other contexts,207 and the same could be
done in the case of patents. Indeed, in the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act,208 Congress provided federal
jurisdiction for suits against state governments for both patent and
trademark infringement.209 However, the Supreme Court in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank210 struck down that legislation, finding that
Congress had not properly supported abrogation in cases of
intellectual property infringement by state governments.211

205

See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
See, e.g., Chew v. State of California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superseded by
statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
superseded by statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
207
See, e.g., Lisa M. Durham, Protection from Age Discrimination for State Employees:
Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 33 GA. L. REV. 541 (1999).
208
Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h)–296
(2000)).
209
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2000).
210
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
211
Id. at 640–43 (1999) (“In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations. Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination
confronting Congress in the voting rights cases . . . Congress came up with little evidence
of infringing conduct on the part of the States. . . . Congress, however, barely considered
the availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence whether the States’
conduct might have amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
206
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Since the decision in Florida Prepaid, bills have been proposed
to abrogate state immunity for intellectual property
infringement.212 The proposed acts seek to squarely ground the
abrogation in the lack of remedies available in state courts.213
Surprisingly, no measure has yet passed, but most anticipate that
this loophole will eventually be closed. The ever-increasing rate at
which states take advantage of the federal patent system214 may
spur public sentiment against the contradiction of allowing them
continued immunity from suit.215
Significantly, for states
interested in taking advantage of the immunity in the interim, if
and when abrogation is reinstated, liability should be retroactive
for all acts of infringement.216
212

See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2031, 107th
Cong.; Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong.
213
See S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 2(1) (2003).
214
See U.S. Colleges and Universities—Utility Patent Grants, Calendar Years 19692000, Tbl. 1.B., at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgn/table_1.htm (last modified May 14, 2002) (showing that patents assigned to Universities have
increased from 82,952 in 1987 to 157,495 in 2000).
215
Theoretically, there may be another way to prevent state drug importation using
federal patent laws that avoids the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The U.S.
Customs Service may seize imports to prevent unfair trade practices if ordered to do so
by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in what is known as a “337
investigation.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) (2000) (implemented by 19 C.F.R. § 12.39
(2004)). One of the primary bases underlying an ITC determination of unfair trade
practices is importation that would infringe a valid patent. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)
(2000). If a patent owner files a complaint with the ITC, it should be possible for the
Commission to make such a determination without the participation of the alleged
infringer, rendering immunity moot. This is because the alleged infringer is not
technically sued; rather, the issue comes before the ITC through in rem jurisdiction over
the imported articles. See Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1380–
83 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1497, 1528–29 (2003) (noting the advantages of suing foreign entities in the
ITC versus federal courts). Of course, this route suffers from the same political failing as
an injunction in patent infringement litigation, namely, that access to essential medicines
is prevented. Additionally, as a practical matter it could be difficult for the Customs
Service to distinguish legal pharmaceutical imports (e.g., those not regulated by the FDA)
from illegal ones.
216
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue, rather than a substantive
defense. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634 (1999). In other words, state governments that infringe violate federal patent
law, but there is simply no federal forum available for the suit. One restraint on the
liability of states is the limitation on damages to the six years preceding the suit. 35
U.S.C. § 286 (2000). If it takes longer than that to abrogate state immunity in this area,
some acts of infringement may be untouchable.

CAHOY

670

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:623

Interestingly, state immunity does not completely moot the
question of liability for government importation plans. A longstanding doctrine permits suit in federal court against individual
state officers who violate federal law while acting in their official
capacities, even when the Eleventh Amendment precludes calling
the state itself into federal court. The genesis of this curious
litigation route is Ex parte Young,217 a 1908 Supreme Court case in
which Young—the attorney general of Minnesota at the time—was
sued to enjoin his enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute
establishing railroad rates.218 Despite the fact that the state was
immune from suit, the court held that an officer enforcing an act in
violation of federal law was open to suit as a mere individual
committing an illegal act in the state’s name.219
The doctrine of Ex parte Young has been asserted in the
context of patent infringement cases. One successful example is
the 1972 case of Hercules Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway
Dept,220 in which a patent owner sued state highway officials for
infringing patents on pesticide and weed control compounds. The
court found that an injunction prohibiting future infringement fell
squarely within the rationale of Ex parte Young by enjoining an
individual illegal act rather than impacting state sovereign
immunity.221 Although the doctrine has received scant use in the
thirty years following Hercules, its general continued viability has
been affirmed in other contexts by very recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence.222 Additionally, one judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has at least suggested, if not

217

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 175, at 12.
219
Id. at 159–60.
220
337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972).
221
Id. at 799.
222
See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261 (1997). Note that, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
74–75 (1996), the Court limited the application of Ex parte Young when a lesser remedial
scheme prescribed by statute would be enhanced or increased by standard federal
injunctive remedies. That would not appear to be the case with regard to federal patent
law, which provides for federal injunctive relief as a discretionary remedy. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 283 (2004).
218
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endorsed, the use of the doctrine as a means of circumventing state
immunity in patent cases.223
Importantly, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is somewhat
circumscribed in that it permits only prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief against the officer, rather than compensation for
past harm such as damages.224 Thus, the threat of such an action
would likely not dissuade state infringement to the same degree as
a patent infringement suit.225 Also, it appears that only illegal acts
directly committed by a state official may be enjoined,226 which
arguably introduces the possibility that third-party acts like
contributory infringement or inducing others to infringe would not
be actionable.
Although this would be a rather strained
interpretation of “legality” under the Patent Act,227 such exclusion
could render Ex parte Young useless in many cases.228
An additional consideration in assessing government liability is
the nature of the entity. Several municipalities have expressed
their intent to undertake their own initiatives.229 Government
entities like cities and counties are technically subdivisions of the
state, but act autonomously and raise their own funds through
taxes. The Supreme Court has therefore determined that such local
government entities are not an arm of the state for Eleventh

223

See Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324,
1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., additional views).
224
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999).
225
Another limitation on Ex parte Young is that it may not enlarge the remedies
normally available by statute. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 7576 (1999) (“Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a
liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the
state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create
the latter [in the list of remedies available though the statute]”). But since injunctive
relief is available under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000), this limitation should not
work to preclude a patent infringement-related cause of action under the doctrine.
226
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (noting the need for a connection
between the state official and the state’s illegal act).
227
A better interpretation of the Patent Act suggests that, given their specific statutory
treatment (35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)–(c) (2000)), inducement and contributory infringement
are illegal acts in and of themselves and should therefore fall under Ex parte Young.
However, it appears that the doctrine has not actually been applied in this manner.
228
See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
229
See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
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Amendment immunity purposes.230 In other words, while state
governments can avoid patent infringement liability for the time
being, any city within the state that imports or induces the import
of patented pharmaceuticals from another country without the
authorization of the patent owner will be liable for all attendant
damages. This exposure could be sufficient to choke off local
importation plans. However, state-level plans could still face an
attack on another front.
C. The Constitution Provides an Additional Source of State and
Municipal Liability for Intruding on Patent Rights
Even if infringement is committed by, or under, the
authorization of a state government, immunity from liability is not
certain simply because access to the federal courts is denied.
There may be an additional route for obtaining relief based on the
fact that patents are, at base, personal property,231 a fact recognized
under both state and federal law.232
From this point of view, patent infringement is basically a type
of trespass to personal property.233 In tangible property contexts,
when a trespass to personal or real property is undertaken by a
government entity, the infringement on personal property rights is
viewed as an exercise of the state’s eminent domain power or
“taking,” in which case the aggrieved property owner is due
constitutionally mandated “just compensation.”234 The property
owner may pursue such an action in the relevant state court.235
230

See Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977) (“The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States
and state officials in appropriate circumstances . . . but does not extend to counties and
similar municipal corporations.”).
231
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
232
See CHISUM, supra note 164, § 8:21.02[1][c].
233
Note that a civil action against a private party for trespass to personal or real property
is, like patent infringement, considered a tort. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 158 (1965) [hereinafter “RESTATEMENT”] (describing liability for intentional
intrusions on land). This is obviously not a barrier to eminent domain actions.
234
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473
(1973) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of the property
taken.’”) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)).
235
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615–16 (2001) (detailing
plaintiff’s lawsuit in Rhode Island Superior Court for compensation based on an alleged
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There is no reason that this basic protection of property rights
should not extend to intangible property like patents when a
trespass or infringement is proven. Although compensation for
takings may not match all of the relief a patent owner may receive
under the Patent Act,236 the liability could be significant enough to
thwart the state importation schemes. Since pursing an intellectual
property infringement claim through this route is relatively novel, a
number of hurdles must be overcome to establish the viability of
such a suit.
1. Access to State Courts to Obtain Relief
The first issue a patent owner must negotiate in pursuing a
patent infringement case on an eminent domain theory is access to
the relevant state court. Federal jurisdictional statutes appear to
give federal courts the exclusive right to hear civil actions “arising
under any Act of Congress” in “patent, plant variety protection and
copyright cases.”237 However, there is good reason to believe that
this statute will not bar a state court from hearing a takings case.
An eminent domain (or inverse condemnation action) against a
state is not based on an act of Congress, but rather is grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.238 The
regulatory taking by the state). The recognition of this form of action has apparently
been a gradual process for the states. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1056–60 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the historical evolution of eminent
domain law in the states).
236
In the context of federal takings of private patent rights, the courts have restricted the
available remedies to actual damages. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d
765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is not available
to a patent owner in a § 1498 action.”) (citing Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d
958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc) (“The injunctive relief of 35 U.S.C. § 283 could not be
awarded, of course, since this court lacks the power to grant such relief.”)). Yet another
route besides suing the state in eminent domain would be to ask the relevant state
legislature to pass a bill appropriating the compensation. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc.
v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (suggesting that plaintiff
could have sought relief from patent infringement by state in form of legislative “claims
bill.”). However, compensating pharmaceutical companies for the losses due to
importation of lower priced drugs is unlikely to be popular enough to pass through the
legislatures.
237
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
238
See Seamon, supra note 9, at 1144 n.374 (“The claim would not be barred by the
federal statute that gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of cases ‘arising
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Federal Circuit in Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Department
of Transportation239 recognized that distinction when it considered
a federal court’s jurisdiction over a patent owner’s infringement
suit against the State of Florida in view of the Eleventh
Amendment.240 The court noted, in dicta, that the plaintiff had
other litigation venues available such as “assert[ing] a ‘takings’
claim against the state under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”241 The Florida Supreme Court in the same
litigation later confirmed that notion by holding that Florida courts
indeed had jurisdiction over Jacobs’ patent takings claim.242
Interestingly, the Florida court’s rationale was based on the
determination that Congress could not have preempted actions that
the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear.243 Although a state’s
jurisdiction to hear an inverse condemnation case related to a
patent may not necessarily depend on a lack of remedy at the
federal level, that situation does exist today as a result of Florida
Prepaid and the lack of any action by Congress to date.244
The corollary to the federal preemption issue is the fact that a
state must also consent to be sued in its own courts. The fact that a
party may have a legitimate cause of action against a government
entity, but no procedure for pursuing it may seem odd, but the
ability to determine the circumstance and forum under which a
government may be sued is recognized under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.245 Moreover, the recent Supreme Court
decision in Alden v. Maine246 held that Congress cannot compel a

under any Act of Congress relating to patents,’ 28 U.S.C. §1338, because the case would
arise under the Constitution, not under the patent laws.”).
239
919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Genentech,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Trans., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1336–37 (Fla.
1993).
243
Id.
244
See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
245
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“‘[I]t is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent . . . .’”) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)); Seamon, supra note
9, at 1090–93.
246
527 U.S. 706 (1999),
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state to open itself to a lawsuit based on a statute grounded in an
Article I power.247 This prompts the question: Can a state refuse to
hear a case relating to inverse condemnation of a property right
created by the Patent Act, derived from Congress’s section eight
enumerated powers?248
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that one can
distinguish between the remedial scheme outlined in the federal
Patent Act249 and the statute’s independent creation of a property
right.250 Although the former can be pursued only in the context of
a specific type of litigation in federal court (i.e., an Article I-based
case as described in Alden), the essential aspects of the property
right can be transferred to another sovereign’s property framework.
In fact, the courts have firmly established that matters relating to
the ownership of patent property, including transfer and licensing,
are exclusively a matter of state law rather than federal.251 If a
state has a procedure for pursuing property takings cases through
its own courts, it seems reasonable that patent property rights
would be included.252 In fact, this treatment of patent property has
support in court decisions from a few states,253 though most have
247

Id. at 713 (“[T]he States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and
which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union
upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”).
248
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
249
35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2000).
250
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
251
See, e.g., Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“[T]the question of who owns patent rights, and on what terms, typically is a
question exclusively for state courts and not one arising under United States patent
laws. . . . A contractual agreement to apply French law as to ownership is just as valid as
an agreement to apply the law of a particular state.”); Studiengesellschaft Köhle, m.b.H.
v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that proper construction of
a patent license agreement “is a question of contract interpretation” under state law).
252
See 1 JULIUS L. SACHMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN § 2.1[2] (3d ed. 1993) (“Intangible property, such as choses in action, patent
rights, franchises, charters, or any other form of contract are within the scope of this
sovereign authority as fully as land or other tangible property.”).
253
See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1336–37
(Fla. 1993); Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992),
dismissed, jurisdictional mot. overruled by 598 N.E.2d 1168 (Ohio 1992); see also A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (considering an

CAHOY

676

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:623

not addressed it. Support can also be found in state court decisions
regarding other types of intellectual property.254
This still leaves open the question of whether a state can
structure the jurisdiction of its courts to specifically refuse to hear
an intellectual property inverse condemnation case. The failure of
such a case due to a lack of jurisdiction is not unprecedented. The
federal government was immune from suits to recover
compensation for property takings until the passage of the Tucker
Act in 1887255 (and from most torts until the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act in 1946).256 In other intellectual property
contexts, some state courts have been reluctant to find eminent
domain jurisdiction.257 However, many commentators have argued
eminent domain action against the state based on patent infringement, but denying it only
because the state was not shown to have been involved in the infringing activity); Chew
v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that Eleventh Amendment
immunity precludes only one avenue of recourse against a state for patent infringement),
superseded by statute as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 710–13 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (stating
that state’s use of a patent constituted an eminent domain taking). There is also vague
support in cases regarding other intellectual property types. See, e.g., Smith v. Lutz, 149
S.W.3d 752, 760–61 (Tex. App. 2004) (considering a plaintiff’s allegation that the
University of Texas engaged in a taking of copyrights and trade secrets, but ultimately
dismissing the claim as inappropriate because it was based on a failed contractual
relationship).
254
See, e.g., State Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 138
(Alaska 1991) (“The companies contend that their oil well data constitute trade secrets
protected under both the Alaska and the United States Constitutions. We agree.”); N.J.
State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 626 (D.N.J. 1985) (“Although
no case has been brought to my attention determining whether an uncompensated taking
of a trade secret would violate the State Constitution, I see no reason why the New Jersey
Supreme Court would not take the same approach as the United States Supreme Court in
this regard.”), aff’d in relevant part, 774 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1985).
255
Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (2003));
see, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894) (holding that plaintiff
could not bring an action against the U.S. under Tucker Act for infringing plaintiff’s
patented process); see also Seamon, supra note 9, at 1090–94.
256
See Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D.
143, 146–49 (1949) (discussing the background to the Federal Tort Claims Act soon after
it was enacted, as well as other federal waivers of immunity, such as the Tucker Act and
the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
257
See, e.g., Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 917 S.W.2d 444, 454 (Tex. App. 1996) (“While
Texas law treats trade secrets as property in some contexts, they have not been classified
as property for the purposes of the taking clause.”), rev’d on other grounds, 970 S.W.2d
520 (Tex. 1998).
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that the U.S. Supreme Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v Los Angeles County258 strongly suggested
that state sovereign immunity does not exist for takings cases
because it is overridden by the just compensation requirement.259
Even if First English cannot be read so broadly, it has been argued
that the most reasonable interpretation of the Due Process Clause
indeed requires states to waive sovereign immunity for inverse
condemnation cases, despite the fact that the obligation appears to
be asymmetric with that of the federal government.260 This due
process obligation in the context of patent property was recently
articulated in “additional views” submitted by Judge Newman in
Xechem International v. University of Texas.261 Assuming the
Supreme Court continues its recent support for enforcing due
process obligations on the states,262 it would appear that a state
would face an uphill battle in attempting to remove jurisdiction for
those seeking just compensation for takings under either federal or
state constitutions.
2. Establishing a Compensable Taking
A second obstacle for patent owners may result from the
somewhat ambiguous nature of an intellectual property taking. A
258

482 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1987).
See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of
Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole
Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
849, 871–72 (1998); Seamon, supra note 9, at 1072 n.19 (listing several other academic
articles that make similar assertions regarding First English).
260
See Seamon, supra note 9, at 1101–10.
261
382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). After discussing the limitations of state immunity
for patent infringement, Judge Newman concluded that:
The circumstances of this case illustrate that when a state is charged with
contravention of federal law in a way that directly affects private property, and
if no remedy is indeed available within the state’s tribunals—whether by the
state’s invocation of immunity or by federal preemption of the cause of
action—there can arise an affront to the fundamentals of due process. Respect
for the principles of federalism does not automatically immunize the state from
due process considerations.
259

Id. at 1335.
262

See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding congressional
abrogation of state immunity in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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state could attempt to avoid liability by claiming the act of
infringement is merely regulatory in nature—a justified use of the
state’s police powers—and not compensable if it leaves a
reasonable economic use of the patent property in question (a very
likely result in the case of pharmaceutical importation takings).263
On the other hand, if takings law as it pertains to physical
occupations of, or interference with, tangible property is applied to
drug importation, just compensation must be paid no matter what
use of the property remains.264 While there is no explicit guidance
in the case law as to which approach applies to intellectual
property, the proper method can be derived through analogies to
tangible property as well as the implicit treatment by the courts.
It is well established that, in the context of real property,
slightly different legal rules apply depending on which of two
primary types of appropriation have occurred. There is the open
and notorious “physical occupation,” wherein a government entity
physically intrudes upon a property owner’s curtilage.265 A
government entity achieves this by taking real property (land or
buildings) for its exclusive use on either a temporary or permanent
basis.266
More recently, the courts have recognized that
government regulation can effectuate a second type of taking when
the regulation severely limits a property owner’s use of the land
through some type of police power derived restriction.267
263
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“We think, in short,
that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.”).
264
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322–24 (1999) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former
owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether
the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”).
265
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427–28 (1982)
(discussing the difference between physical takings and regulatory takings, noting that
the latter relates to use restrictions only).
266
See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378–79 (1945) (finding a
taking when the government temporarily occupied a building for a public purpose);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372. 374–75 (1946) (finding a taking when
the government temporarily occupied a building under lease to another).
267
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.

CAHOY

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION

679

Generally, the owner’s ability to exclude the physical presence of
others—including the government—is not affected.268 Unlike
physical occupations, regulatory takings must be quite onerous to
be compensable. Essentially all economically beneficial use of the
property must be forestalled by the government regulation before
the act is transformed from merely an exercise of police power to a
compensable appropriation.269 The rules related to real property
appear fairly well characterized, at least conceptually, but the
application is not always cogent or consistent.
The scheme for addressing government intrusions on personal
property is similar, though the manner in which a government
entity “occupies” such property is obviously different. A physical
intrusion on personal property occurs when that property is either
temporarily confiscated, or permanently taken or destroyed.270 In
either case, the property owner’s rights must be substantially
affected. Theoretically, the government can also regulate one’s
use of personal property so strictly as to prevent reasonable future
economic use. However, the case law suggests that such incidents
are rare.271 Moreover, even when the facts arguably support such
an allegation, plaintiffs have had little success against government
entities.272
How does the legal structure for tangible property fit
intellectual property rights? As an intangible, intellectual property
obviously cannot be physically occupied, captured or damaged
(though it can be destroyed or eliminated).273 Additionally, since
intellectual property rights do not include the right to use what is

268

Id. at 1044 (Blackmun, H., dissenting).
Id.
270
See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383–84 (determining that compensation was owed
for destruction or devaluation of trade fixtures—a type of personal property—during a
temporary occupation of a building).
271
See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998) (noting only one regulatory
case involving personal property); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 46
(2001) (failing to note more than one case of the application of regulatory takings law to
personal property), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
272
See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
273
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192–93 (Ct.
App. 2004) (noting, in the context of the Internet, that disclosure of a trade secret
destroys it).
269
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covered,274 regulatory intrusion would also seem to be impossible.
But there must be some link between traditional eminent domain
law and intellectual property rights, or the “property”
nomenclature is misdescriptive. The solution to this conundrum
lies in the fact that, at base, physical intrusions on tangible
property are nothing more than infringements on the property
owner’s right to exclude others (including the government) from
the property.275 Interfering with this right is the essence of a
physical occupation, and various physical interactions are simply
different flavors of the same cuisine. In fact, real property takings
have been found when a government merely prohibits the property
owner from keeping outsiders away, even if the government makes
no direct use of the property.276 Although intellectual property
rights differ in what activities the owner may prevent others from
undertaking,277 a breach of any of these rights of exclusion
necessarily diminishes the value of the property in a similar
fashion to a physical occupation of tangible property.278

274

While the act of invention itself “vests an inventor with a common law or ‘natural’
right to make, use and sell his or her invention absent conflicting patent rights in others,”
Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991), a patent
conveys the additional right to exclude others from making, using, selling or offering to
sell the invention. Id. (citing Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568,
571 (9th Cir. 1931)).
275
See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“In this case, we hold
that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation.” But see Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (holding that the right to exclude spotted owls, as eliminated by government
regulation, is not a permanent physical occupation), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003).
276
See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (finding that a servitude on landowner’s navigable
waterway took the landowner’s right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”).
277
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g) (2003).
278
Note that courts have found this to be the case even if minimal monetary damages
accrue. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The
right to exclude others from a specific market, no matter how large or small that market,
is an essential element of the patent right. As we have stated, ‘because the principal
value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the patent grant weighs
against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee
whole.’”) (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1456–57 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
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Therefore, infringement of an intellectual property owner’s rights
of exclusion should be treated as a physical occupation.279
Another way to conceptualize the nature of government takings
of intellectual property is to consider the parallels between the
government acts that constitute takings, and the acts of private
parties that violate an owner’s rights. Physical takings of tangible
property are akin to trespass to real or personal property.280 Both
involve intentional acts281 that lead to the breaching of one’s
property boundaries. Tangible takings and trespass are largely coextensive.282 The same should be true of intellectual property. In
other words, the same acts that would constitute the parallel to
trespass—infringement—should
theoretically
constitute
a
283
taking.
Although a definitive connection between tangible and
intangible takings is not laid out in either state or federal statutory
law, there is a relatively clear delineation in the common law of the
279

As straightforward as this analysis may seem, creating a proper analogy for
intellectual property takings is no simple task. If the government intrusion is like a
physical taking, compensation is relatively automatic, and the degree of the intrusion is a
question relevant for determining damages only. However, if government intrusion is
like a regulatory takings, a much more complicated assessment must be undertaken. See
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (“The first category of cases [physical
taking] requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second [regulatory taking] necessarily
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government
actions.”).
280
Also known as “trespass to chattels.”
281
Trespass to land and chattels are considered “intentional torts.” See Sheehan v.
United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1172 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that some intentional torts
like trespass are not excluded from the Federal Torts Claims Act). This means that the
act undertaken was intentional knowing that certain harm is substantially certain to result.
See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §§ 13, 14 (5th ed. 1984).
One need not have intended to “trespass.”
282
The exception may be where the government trespass/taking is transitory and caused
by actions removed from the property (such as causing a flood). See Sanguinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (to be a taking, flooding must “constitute an actual,
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not merely an
injury to, the property”); United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 809–10
(1950).
283
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35–36 (1985). Epstein draws parallels between private tort and eminent domain
law, and states that the relevant question in determining the existence of a taking is:
“Would the government action be treated as a taking of private property if it had been
performed by some private party? If so, there is a taking of private property . . . .” Id.

CAHOY

682

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:623

most relevant judicial fora. Recent cases involving patent takings
by the federal government are in line with the analogy to physical
takings due to the application of compensation without proceeding
through a regulatory analysis.284 In fact, most court decisions fail
to address the issue, simply referring to the government taking or
infringement as an eminent domain exercise. Conversely, it is
perhaps more instructive that no courts have found copyright or
patent takings to be “regulatory takings.” The physical occupation
scheme intuitively seems most appropriate.
If there is any argument to be made for the application of a
regulatory takings scheme, it would likely be based in the Supreme
Court’s rather curious decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.285 In
that case, the Court considered Monsanto’s allegation that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency disclosed and thus destroyed
trade secret information that Monsanto provided to the agency in
confidence as part of its regulatory obligation.286 While finding
that such an effect on even an intangible property right constituted
a Fifth Amendment taking, the Court also stated that the
determination as to whether a taking occurred must consider
whether “a governmental action has gone beyond ‘regulation’” by
looking to such factors as “the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations.”287 In other words, the Court
applied a regulatory takings analysis. Importantly, the Court did
not suggest that such a test should be exclusively employed in all
cases, or even that it applied to all types of intellectual property.288
However, it does stand out as the Supreme Court’s only decision
on the treatment of such intangible takings. Considering the
Federal Circuit’s handling of patent takings, the closer analogy to
tangible property physical occupations, and the openings left in
Ruckelshaus in terms of available legal theory, is reasonable to
treat the case as distinguishable or inapplicable. This approach has
284

See, e.g., Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, it should be recognized that the government infringement statute is written to
compensate automatically, so a conclusion is hard to draw. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
285
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
286
Id. at 1000–01.
287
Id. at 1005.
288
Id.
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been acknowledged in the context of litigation and academic
theory.289
3. “Just Compensation” for Patent Infringement
If states are, in fact, liable in their own courts under a takings
theory, what is the appropriate measure of just compensation?
Though this may appear to be a secondary issue compared to the
establishment of liability, it is in many ways just as important: a
patent property right requiring a minor licensing fee for an
importation taking is a mere road bump, whereas one that
implicates compensation for all of the patentee’s losses is a
veritable brick wall. As with the compensation trigger discussed
above, the answer is not entirely clear due to the nature of this type
of intellectual property taking. If an entire patent right is
appropriated or eliminated by the state, an accounting method
similar to that used for the sale of the intellectual property would
reasonably be employed to determine the value of the property
lost.290 However, a taking that infringes only part of the right,
while leaving the remainder, is less straight forward. Again, an
analogy to patent infringement actions provides the best guidance.
The federal Patent Act is fairly clear in outlining the source of
remedies for private party infringement, if not the precise method
of calculation.291 However, it does not necessarily follow that all
of these measures are available in a suit against a government
entity. In fact, to the extent that certain remedies are intended to
punish an infringer for tortious behavior like willfulness,292 they
would seem in conflict with the principles of the Fifth and
289

See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 706 (2003) (“[A]s [Ruckelshaus
v.] Monsanto does not preclude the recognition of other forms of takings, Plaintiff could
allege a taking of a different sort from either [regulatory taking or physical taking]
categories.”); Cotter, supra note 9, at 558–65 (arguing that there are strong reasons for
limiting Ruckelshaus to its facts and finding that unauthorized government use of
intellectual property always effectuates a taking).
290
See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
& INTANGIBLE ASSETS 170 (3d ed. 2000) (“The income approach is best suited for the
appraisal of . . . patents, trademarks, and copyrights . . . .”).
291
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–85 (2000).
292
See id. § 284 (stating that a damages award may be increased up to three times the
actual amount at the discretion of the court).
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Fourteenth Amendments, which do not seek to dissuade the
intentional use of eminent domain powers so long as just
compensation is paid.293 Nevertheless, there are parallels between
some aspects of patent infringement damages and eminent domain.
In eminent domain jurisprudence, the object of compensation is
to provide the property owner with the “fair market value” of the
property taken.294 While it is understood that this may not
compensate the property owner to complete indifference (as the
complete right to exclude can never be reconstructed), the intent is
to put the owner in the same position as existed before the
taking.295 Similarly, the basic forms of damages available under
the Patent Act are intended to compensate the patent owner for the
effects of the infringement. If it can be shown, with reasonable
probability, that a patent owner lost sales due to infringement, the
profits from those sales can be obtained to compensate the owner
to indifference.296 Alternatively, if the patent owner cannot
demonstrate lost profits, a reasonable royalty guarantees some
compensation for the breach of the right to exclude others from the
invention.297
While it seems logical to use the existing lost profits and
reasonable royalty framework to measure eminent domain
293

See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969–79 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc)
(“An aggrieved party is entitled to receive only reasonable and entire compensation, not
more than that . . . . Unlike his counterpart in a private infringement suit, he is not entitled
to be the recipient of increased damages heaped on other parties as punishment or
deterrence.”) (citations omitted).
294
City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915) (“But what the owner is entitled to
is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a
purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact . . . .”); see also United
States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
295
Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 16; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 283, at 182 (“In principle the
ideal solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the
taking by the government and retention of the property.”).
296
See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(plurality opinion) (The statutory measure of damages is “the difference between [the
patent owner’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would
have been if the infringement had not occurred.”); accord Grain Processing Corp. v. Am.
Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
297
See State Indus. v Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (award of
damages may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven
and a reasonable royalty for the remainder).
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compensation, not everyone agrees. In particular, the government
has argued in the course of several federal patent takings cases that
a reasonable royalty is generally all that is required.298 This has
been echoed by commentators299 as well as a few early court
decisions.300 According to this line of reasoning, if lost profits are
ever to be awarded, a plaintiff must demonstrate their
appropriateness in accordance with a more difficult to achieve
“clear and convincing” standard of proof.301 However, a recent
decision from the Federal Circuit in Gargoyles, Inc. v. United
States302 casts doubt on the distinction between eminent domain
compensation and patent damages by suggesting that the latter is
applicable in its current form.303 Since the matter has yet to be
firmly resolved,304 state governments would be wise to consider
the worst case scenario of lost profits in their risk assessments.
If state governments are on the hook for lost profits damages in
many importation cases, the damages may well preclude the
viability of the programs. As described above, because the
measure of damages could be the difference in the U.S. sales price
versus the foreign price, it may be a zero sum (or worse) game.
298

See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(emphasis added).
299
See, e.g., Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and
Government Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389 (1995). But see David M. Schlitz & Richard J. McGrath,
Patent Infringement Claims Against the United States Government, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 351,
365 (2000) (Concluding that lost profits should be recoverable in many more cases than
most people realize, the authors observe that “there are potentially large rewards in
meritorious suits against the government, which for the most part have not been
pursued.”).
300
See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 7, at 155–61 (reviewing several cases from the Federal
Claims Court and the Federal Circuit that seem to indicate a preference for a reasonable
royalty in § 1498 damages assessments).
301
See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348–49 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (“But even
if we assume that lost profits is still a viable measure of recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1498,
we cannot adopt that standard in this case because it has not been sufficiently shown by
clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff . . . would have made and kept the profits it
now demands.”).
302
113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
303
Id. at 1576 (“We also note that the announcement of the ‘strictest proof’ standard in
Tektronix is supported only by general references to the Fifth Amendment and the court’s
reticence to award lost profits against the government . . . .”).
304
See Cahoy, supra note 135, at 160.
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The barrier provided by constitutional takings law may be, in
effect, insurmountable.
D. The Impact of the Constitution on Federal Liability is in Flux
In view of the problems facing private entities, as well as state
and municipal drug importation programs, one might assume that
the federal government would step in as a player. Although its
current position has been to discourage drug importation and it is
currently poised to do no more than lightly regulate imports,305 the
government could become a more active participant. For example,
an administrative agency such as Health and Human Services
could engage in active importation, or at least actively facilitate the
importation by private parties through Web portals and other
directing resources. At the very least, it could do so for
government-funded purchases through programs like Medicare.306
Of course, the federal government can also be liable for infringing
patents, even though it is the sovereign source of the grant.307
Would this effectively preclude this importation route as well?
Curiously, the answer depends on unsettled law regarding whether
a plaintiff has the right to pursue a remedy for this particular type
of infringement.
Since 1910, patent owners have had an explicit right of action
against the federal government if it is found to have “used or
manufactured [a patented invention] by or for the United States
without license of the thereof or lawful right to use of manufacture
the same.”308 This right, detailed in the U.S. Code, provides a
method for obtaining compensation based on either direct
government use or the government’s authorization of another’s

305

See Rowland, supra note 4.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
307
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
308
That predecessor statute to § 1498 was enacted in 1910, and it contained essentially
the same language as the current version with respect to rights infringed and
compensation required. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, amended by Act of
July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705. The prior statute was originally codified as part of the
Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1940), and reorganized as § 1498 of Title 28 in 1948. Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 941.
306
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use.309 While the statute uses neither the phrase “infringement”
nor “taking,” it appears to bridge the gap between the two concepts
by providing for liability for informal and inadvertent intellectual
property infringements, while using language similar to the
Constitution in articulating the remedy for unlawful use of
inventions.310
Despite the constitutional overtones in § 1498, the federal
government has occasionally argued that it does not actually
exercise eminent domain power over patents when it intrudes on
the rights of the owner. Rather, the government contends that it
actually exercises a license option that is included within the
original patent grant.311 A few courts have entertained this notion,
most particularly the trial-level United States Court of Federal
Claims in the case of De Graffenried v. United States,312 which
stated that the government has a statutory right to use all patented
inventions.313 However, more recent decisions from the Federal
309

See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) (“Whenever an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture. . . . For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or manufacture for
the United States.”).
310
See id.
311
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 692 (2003) (reviewing U.S.
government’s argument that § 1498 cases are not infringements but merely the exercise
of a type of inherent licensing authority on the part of the government). In effect, this
would be a compulsory license. In more specific contexts, the federal government does
retain recognized compulsory licensing rights. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–11 (2000) (BayhDole Act provisions that give private parties the right to own patents in federally-funded
inventions, but reserves in the federal government a nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license for the invention to practice it or have it practiced for or on
the government’s behalf throughout the world); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) (providing for
compulsory licensing of patents having “primary importance in the production or
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy”); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000)
(providing for compulsory licensing of patents necessary to enable any person to comply
with the implementation of Clean Air Act requirements).
312
29 Fed. Cl. 384 (1993).
313
Id. at 387–88 (“[T]he government does not have to resort to exercising its sovereign
power of eminent domain to utilize a patent owner’s patented invention because the
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Circuit as well as other opinions from the Claims Court suggest
that this analysis is erroneous.314 Additionally, it has been noted
that if this theory were true, jurisdiction for compensation
grounded in the “unlawful” use or manufacture of a patented
invention would be nonsensical; all use would theoretically be
lawful.315 This is logically inconsistent with the legislative intent
in providing such a mechanism for plaintiffs.
As a straightforward reading suggests, § 1498 has a number of
limitations that would specifically impact the importation debate.
First and foremost, the statute does not provide for liability for
contributory infringement/takings or inducement of another’s
infringement.316 Only acts by or under the authority of the
government are covered.317 More importantly, the statute appears
to cover only the acts of direct infringement that were recognized
at the time the statute was first enacted in 1910. Since then, the
Patent Act has evolved to contain additional rights, and it has been
found that these rights were not automatically incorporated into §

statutory framework that defines a patent owner’s property rights gives the government
the authority to use all patented inventions.”).
314
See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(recovery is based on eminent domain); Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl.
748, 756 (1999) (“Use by the government of a patented invention without an express
license from the patentee is properly viewed as a taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution through the government’s exercise of its power of
eminent domain.”); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en
banc) (“This court has traditionally searched the law of eminent domain for legal
precedents and principles to apply in determining the ‘reasonable and entire
compensation’ to be granted in a valid infringement action against the government.”);
Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (“The theory underlying a
patent suit in this court pursuant to [§ 1498] is that the Government, when a patent device
or invention is made or used by or for the United States, ipso facto takes by eminent
domain a compulsory compensable license in the patent; the patentee obtains his Fifth
Amendment just compensation for that taking through his action here under § 1498.”).
315
See Zoltek Corp., 58 Fed. Cl. at 700.
316
Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
government has not waived sovereign immunity for collateral acts like inducement and
contributory infringement.”); Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (“Further, the Government can only be sued for any direct infringement of a
patent (35 U.S.C. § 271(a)), and not for inducing infringement by another (section
271(b)) or for contributory infringement (section 271(c)).”).
317
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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1498.318 For example, the right to exclude imports, added in to the
Patent Act in 1994, cannot be the basis of a § 1498 claim.319
In view of the § 1498 limitations, one could imagine a
government program to purchase and distribute (or even sell)
imported pharmaceuticals that would not infringe a patent owner’s
rights under the statute. At the very least, it could provide a
significant negotiating tool that drives down prices. All of this, of
course, is premised on the notion that § 1498 provides the
exclusive means for obtaining relief for U.S. government patent
takings. A recent case has brought this into question by
concluding that a plaintiff’s right to receive compensation may not
be so limited.320
The logic for looking outside of §1498 starts from the
proposition that patents are personal property rights and
government infringement is a type of taking.321 This, in turn,
suggests that the same jurisdiction implicated to resolve disputes
regarding tangible property should apply to intellectual property.
Specifically, since the end of the Nineteenth Century, plaintiffs
have been able to pursue a remedy against the federal government
under the Tucker Acts. The so-called Little Tucker Act is reserved
for cases that amount to less than $10,000 and confers concurrent
original jurisdiction in federal district courts and the Court of
Federal Claims.322 The Big Tucker Act323 concerns greater
monetary amounts and confers exclusive jurisdiction in the Court
of Federal Claims.324 Both statutes give their respective federal
courts the ability to “render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded . . . upon the Constitution.”325 Among the
318

Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 837 (2002) (“Because nothing in the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the meaning and effect of section
1498 to change in congruence with changes in 35 U.S.C. § 271, the Court is constrained
to hold that section 1498 does not apply to all forms of direct infringement as currently
defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271.”).
319
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983
(1994).
320
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003), discussed in detail infra.
321
See supra notes 271–79 and accompanying text.
322
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000); see also Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
323
Hereinafter, both Acts will be collectively referred to as “the Tucker Act.”
324
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2001); see also Preseault, 494 U.S. at 12.
325
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2001).
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recognized types of claims founded on the Constitution are Fifth
Amendment-based takings of property.326 If patent takings fit into
this category, this is no reason why Tucker Act jurisdiction should
not apply.
The importance of allowing patent plaintiffs to use the Tucker
Act is that the jurisdiction is bounded only by constitutional
liability. This would extend to all aspects of the property right as
opposed to a few specific articulations; the Tucker Act should
cover what has been left out of § 1498. However, there is a bit of a
legal puzzle concerning the integration of § 1498 and the Tucker
Act that complicates the analysis. The Tucker Act was passed
many years before the first iteration of § 1498.327 How can its
coverage be broader and inclusive of a later-enacted statute? In
other words, did § 1498 impliedly supersede and eliminate some
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, or was § 1498 simply redundant
and unnecessary? If the latter is the case, the federal government
cannot escape liability for direct pharmaceutical importation or
sales on grounds of sovereign immunity.
To put this issue in perspective, one must take a trip back in
time to the Nineteenth Century when the Tucker Act was passed.
Even at that point in history, it is clear that courts and legislators
believed that intellectual property rights like patents should be
treated like any other type of property, including in terms of
eminent domain law. For example, in the 1881 case of James v.
Campbell,328 the Supreme Court noted:
That the government of the United States when it grants
letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts,
confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
326

See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the
claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the [Court of
Federal Claims] to hear and determine.”).
327
See ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C., but primarily in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1941); Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry
Unravels: Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 602, 606–11 (2003) (“Prior to 1855, individuals with contract or other
monetary claims against the federal government were barred by sovereign immunity from
seeking redress in court and thus were left to petition Congress to enact legislation—in
the form of ‘private bills’—appropriating funds to pay those claims.”).
328
104 U.S. 356 (1881).
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patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by
the government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no
doubt.329
When the Tucker Act was enacted in 1887, one would think it
would be read to encompass any taking of property rights,
including one involving patents. But in a strange and contradictory
move, in 1894, the Supreme Court declared in Schillinger v.
United States330 that the unauthorized use of a patent sounded in
tort rather than eminent domain, and plaintiffs had no recourse
through the Tucker Act.331 This effectively put intellectual
property into a different category from tangible property.
Congress enacted the predecessor statute to § 1498 specifically in
response to Schillinger in order to provide jurisdiction for
government patent infringement “torts.”332 Confusingly, Congress
apparently believed this to be justified and necessary in
consideration of federal government’s responsibilities under the
Fifth Amendment.333 Regardless, as of 1910, patent owners could
only use the specific jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress to
obtain relief.
The law became murkier following the Supreme Court’s
subsequent
decision
in
Crozier
v.
Fried
Krupp
Aktiengesellschaft.334 In that case, which related to the U.S.
Army’s unauthorized use of a patent on artillery design, the Court
interpreted and considered the application of § 1498’s predecessor
329

Id. at 357–58.
155 U.S. 163 (1894).
331
Id. at 168–69 (“It is true also that to jurisdiction over claims founded ‘upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States,’ is added
jurisdiction over claims ‘for damages, liquidated or unliquidated,’ but this grant is limited
by the provision ‘in cases not sounding in tort.’”).
332
H.R. Rep. No. 1288, at 3 (1910) (report accompanying the bill which became the
predecessor statute to § 1498) (“Our only purpose is to extend the jurisdiction of that
court so that it may entertain suits and award compensation to the owners of patents in
cases where the use of the invention by the United States is unauthorized and unlawful; in
short, to give the court in patent cases, in addition to the jurisdiction it now has in matters
of contract, jurisdiction in cases of tort.”).
333
Id. at 2–3.
334
224 U.S. 290 (1912).
330
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shortly after it was enacted. Following a discussion of Schillinger
that noted its denial of tort jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, the
Court held that the new statute effectively filled this gap.335
However, the Court went on to specifically describe the
government’s unauthorized use or manufacture of an invention as
an act of eminent domain as opposed to a tort.336 The Court
remarked that the statute’s clear intent was to provide a remedy for
takings.337 The Crozier decision appears to merge the concepts of
infringement and eminent domain in the context of patent disputes.
Though it did not suggest Tucker Act jurisdiction was available in
such a case, it was not ruled out either.
In 2003, Chief Judge Damich of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims considered the availability of remedies outside of the §
1498 structure in Zoltek Corp. v. United States.338 Zoltek sued the
U.S. government for infringing/taking its patent rights relating to a
process for manufacturing silicon carbide fiber sheets used in
fighter aircraft.339 The government allegedly imported fibers
manufactured in a foreign country, which would violate Zoltek’s
rights under a specific provision of the patent act.340 Because this
relatively recent addition to U.S. patent rights was not incorporated
into § 1498, the court, in an earlier decision, determined that
compensation could not be obtained through this statute.341
However, Zoltek contended that the act of importation was
nonetheless a taking of property, cognizable under the broader
335

Id. at 303–07.
Id. at 305–07.
337
Id at 307 (“[W]e think there is no room for doubt that the statute makes full and
adequate provision for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for which,
considered in its final analysis, it was the purpose of the statute to provide.”).
338
58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003).
339
Id. at 689.
340
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2003) (“Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by
a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation,
offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process
patent. . . .”).
341
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 837 (2002) (“Because nothing in the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the meaning and effect of section
1498 to change in congruence with changes in 35 U.S.C. § 271, the Court is constrained
to hold that section 1498 does not apply to all forms of direct infringement as currently
defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271.”).
336
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Tucker Act.
In a decision involving some delicate legal
maneuvering, the court agreed.342
The basis of the court’s decision was that Crozier overruled
Schillinger’s narrow interpretation of the Tucker Act.343 The court
determined that Crozier held government patent infringement to be
an act of eminent domain, and that the predecessor to § 1498 was a
remedial measure necessary only during those intervening years
following Schillinger.344 Despite the current redundancy of §
1498, the court found that it could be integrated with the Tucker
Act by allowing the latter to extend jurisdiction to acts of
infringement not covered under the former.345 The court noted that
remedies for both cases would be restricted to those described
under § 1498 (which, if based on eminent domain, should not be
different than those available under the Tucker Act).346
The analysis in Zoltek could be a bit harder to reconcile in
consideration of Congress’s clear beliefs throughout the Twentieth
Century, a period when it enacted not only the predecessor statute
to § 1498, but also an amendment that provided jurisdiction for
copyright infringement/takings.347 The copyright amendment was
added much more recently, in 1960, and it is clear from the
legislative history of that move that Congress believed that
jurisdiction was not otherwise available.348 Thus, to follow the
342

Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 704 (2003).
Id. at 702 (“Thus, Crozier effectively overruled Schillinger sub silentio and
reinstated the theory of James v. Campbell ‘[t]hat the government of the United States
when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the
patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or
used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can
appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private
purchaser, we have no doubt.’”) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58
(1881)).
344
Id. at 700–02.
345
Id. at 702–03 (“Thus, regarding rights created by the Patent Act other than use or
manufacture, the Tucker Act can provide jurisdiction to this Court without conflicting
with § 1498.”).
346
Id. at 704.
347
Pub. L. 86-726, §§ 1, 4, 74 Stat. 855, 856 (1960) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c)
(2000)).
348
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 1877, at 3 (1960):
When the Government deliberately publishes a copyrighted article, without
obtaining the prior consent of the copyright proprietor, the general assumption
343
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reasoning of Zoltek, one must accept that Congress was so
mistaken regarding Tucker Act jurisdiction that it enacted two
separate, completely unnecessary statutes. If so, it is a little
surprising that no court has raised the issue until the turn of this
century.
Despite the prior confusion surrounding intellectual property
and eminent domain law, the most reasonable position is that
adopted by the Zoltek court. Odd as it may seem, it appears that
both Congress and the Supreme Court have been periodically
confused as to the relationship between property torts and
takings.349 The fact is, as described above,350 they are not different
in nature, but only in context. A physical intrusion on private
property, violating the owner’s right to exclude, is a tort when it
occurs between two private individuals.351 However, when the
trespasser is a government entity, the very same infringement may
be an act of inverse condemnation based on eminent domain
powers.352 This is entirely clear in the law concerning tangible
property, but for some reason has become muddled when
intellectual property is involved.

would be that the holder, pursuant to the principles of “just compensation”
under the Fifth Amendment of our Constitution should be entitled to an action
against the Government for infringement. Yet no such infringement cases have
been reported so far as this committee can determine. The reason appears to be
that the Government, under still another established concept, i.e., “sovereign
immunity,” must consent to be sued for this particular type of wrong, and as yet
has not so consented.
349
See, e.g., id.; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894). It is interesting
to note that, in the Senate Report on the copyright amendment to § 1498, the belief that
the federal government enjoyed immunity from copyright suits appears to be based
largely on the empirical fact that none had been attempted, rather than a thoughtful legal
analysis. S. REP. NO. 1877, at 3; see supra note 348.
350
See supra Part IV.C.2.
351
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 233, § 158; KEETON ET AL., supra note 281, §§ 13, 14.
352
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982)
(drawing parallels between the special kind of damage a property owner incurs when a
stranger physically invades his or her property, and the government’s obligations under
the Fifth Amendment); Drury v. United States, 902 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. La. 1995);
Palm v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that “because of
this gray area, the same set of facts may, under certain circumstances, constitute viable
claims under both legal theories”), aff’d sub. nom. Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d
1270 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Some commentators have argued that there is a distinction, but
it is not tort law versus eminent domain, but rather non-intentional
torts versus authorized acts of intrusion.353 Patent infringement is
generally recognized as an unintentional tort,354 whereas acts of
eminent domain must occur with the authority of the sovereign to
be constitutional.355 In truth, referring to patent infringement as a
no-intent harm is probably an artifact of some early ill-reasoning—
it could be argued that patent infringement requires general intent
(as opposed to specific intent) in the same way that trespass to
personal property or chattels does356—but this notion exists in the
law nonetheless. However, even if one may be “strictly liable” for
patent infringement without any intent,357 many infringers are well
aware of the implications of their acts.358 And to the extent a
patent infringement/taking is intentional (such as importing a
pharmaceutical explicitly covered by a patent)359 there would seem
353

See, e.g., Jed Silversmith, Takings, Torts & Turmoil: Reviewing the Authority
Requirement of the Just Compensation Clause, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 359, 389–
94 (2001).
354
See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Rader, J., concurring) (“Similarly, because intent is irrelevant to patent infringement, an
experimental use excuse cannot survive.”); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
355
See Silversmith, supra note 353, at 368–72.
356
RESTATEMENT, supra note 233, § 217(b) (“A trespass to a chattel may be committed
by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of
another . . . .”); id. § 158(a) (“One is subject to liability to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the
other, if he intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other. . . .”).
357
See, e.g., Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570 n.2 (“Infringement itself, however, is a strict
liability offense . . . .”).
358
This is the primary reason that courts enhance damages as permitted by 35 U.S.C. §
284. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“While no
statutory standard dictates the circumstances under which the district court may exercise
its discretion, this court has approved such awards where the infringer acted in wanton
disregard of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful.”).
359
Information regarding which patents, if any, a manufacturer believes cover a
particular drug is publicly available—now even through the Internet—via the FDA’s
Orange Book. See Electric Orange Book, supra note 26. While knowledge of a patent is
not, in and of itself, enough to create a finding of willfulness, it does obligate a party to
investigate further the potential for infringement. See Comark Communications, Inc. v.
Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit recently
addressed the obligation to investigate potential infringement, affirming the “affirmative
duty of due care to avoid infringement,” but eliminating the negative inference for not
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to be no basis for distinguishing between eminent domain takings
and private infringement (except in terms of remedies). Thus, in
the current context, this distinction is not important.
The liability for direct federal government involvement in
importation appears to substantially lessen the attractiveness of this
option. In combination with the barriers facing states and
municipalities, such large scale programs to ensure safety follows
low prices may be foreclosed. Of course, the foregoing analysis
addresses existing law at it affects importation. However, one
could reasonably ask, if the legal rights afforded pharmaceutical
patent owners present such daunting liability concerns for
importers, why not just change the law? Indeed, Congress is
considering bills that would do just this.
However, the
Constitution ensures that such measures are not so easily enacted.
IV. A CATCH-22: CONSTITUTIONAL ROADBLOCKS IN REVISING
PATENT RIGHTS TO PERMIT IMPORTATION
A revision of the current rules could be accomplished by
relatively simple legislative action. Of course, when established
property rights are limited or eliminated by Congress, there are
constitutional hurdles that must be addressed for such changes in
the law to stand. In the case of patent property rights on important
pharmaceuticals, it appears that the benefits of legal change would
either be offset by the costs, or delayed for an intolerable amount
of time. A review of current legislative proposals suggests that this
may be an intractable issue that Congress cannot simply draft
away.
A. Legislation that Negatively Impacts Established Property
Rights
Because the boundaries of the patent right are defined by the
Patent Act’s infringement provision360 as well as a few common
law rules such as national exhaustion, Congress can eliminate an
seeking the advice of outside counsel. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzpahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
360
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).

CAHOY

4/25/2005 4:19 PM

2005] PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTATION

697

unwanted category of infringement very directly. In the case of
international exhaustion, the legislature could simply rewrite the
statute to overrule Jazz Photo and impose exhaustion following an
authorized international sale. Such a revision could even be
targeted to a specific field, such as pharmaceuticals. How this is
accomplished with respect to existing property rights, however,
determines whether such a revision will be upheld, or declared
unconstitutional.
1. Constitutional Obstacles to Revising Property Rights
Although extensions rather than reductions of patent rights
have typically been the rule over recent years,361 rights have been
explicitly excised at times. In many cases, reductions are coupled
with extensions, and the net effect of a particular law is a bit
unclear. For example, provisions in 1984’s Hatch-Waxman Act
that resulted in the loss of a pharmaceutical patent owner’s right to
sue infringers for using the patented invention to conduct research
in preparation for a FDA application362 were arguably offset by the
patent owner’s ability to obtain extensions of patent rights for
regulatory delay.363 The argument that a legal revision has a
neutral economic effect can be very important in terms of
constitutional considerations, as described below.364
There have, however, been instances wherein patent rights
were simply eliminated. Often, such measures appear to have been
provoked by a political problem rather than a legal (or economic)
one. Perhaps the best example is the 1996 act entitled Limitations
on Patent Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner’s

361
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 16, ch. 2, pp. 18–22 (referring to a
general strengthening of the patent system through Congress and the courts).
362
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000) (amended 2003) (note that the 2003 amendment now
expressly grants subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts for a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement where the patent holder fails to bring an action within 45
days after notice under 21 U.S.C. § 355).
363
35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (2003); see also Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 190.
364
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt.2, at 27–30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711–14 (considering whether the Hatch-Waxman Act would result
in an unconstitutional taking of intellectual property and determining that it does not).
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Performance of a Medical Activity.365 This law eliminated
infringement liability for medical practitioners who infringe
patents in the course of their medical activities.366 It was passed as
part of the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for that
year367 with the poignant implication that medical practitioners
were suffering under burdensome patent infringement liability.368
The law abolished these patent rights due to a perception that such
enforcement would be socially unacceptable369 and merely added
to health care costs.370 After some initial protest in the patent
community, the revision has now been accepted, or at least
tolerated.
The greatest obstacle the legislature faces in curtailing patent
rights is the Fifth Amendment.371 The courts have been clear that a
legislative act that harms or eliminates existing property rights may
constitute a taking, triggering the Constitution’s just compensation
requirement.372 This characterization applies even when the act
affects only a small part of a broad property right.373 If a statute
making such a change does not provide a means for obtaining just

365

See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616
(1996).
366
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
367
See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment:
Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 147,
154–57 (1996).
368
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical
Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 789–90 (1996) (reviewing the
background behind the adoption of the limitation).
369
Id.
370
See 142 Cong. Rec. S. 12024 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frist).
371
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
372
See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532–34 (1998) (“Retroactivity is generally
disfavored in the law . . . . In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), this Court
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is directed at the retroactivity of penal legislation,
while suggesting that the Takings Clause provides a similar safeguard against
retrospective legislation concerning property rights.”).
373
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 429–30 (1982)
(“Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupation, clearly establish that
permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone lines,
rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively
insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use of
the rest of his land.”).
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compensation, it is unconstitutional and will be struck down by a
court, at least in part.374
Faced with the constitutional impediment, Congress has two
choices: (1) create a mechanism for paying just compensation or
(2) draft the law so as to only apply prospectively. The former is
usually impractical for reasons described above, but the latter is
commonly utilized.375 Unfortunately, in the fight to curb drug
costs, prospective application of the law would render it useless in
the near term.
Prospective application of a revision to the Patent Act means
that only patents issuing after the law takes effect would be subject
to the reduced rights.376 Existing patent rights would remain the
same. This is significant because patents are usually obtained for
products years before they traverse the complex and time
consuming procedures for FDA marketing approval.377 Thus, a
prospective patent right restriction would not only fail to impact
products that are currently on the market, but new products
arriving on the market for several years would be free of the new
374

See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 538 (invalidating a provision of Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act that required a former operator to fund health benefits for retired
miners who had worked for the operator before it left the coal industry). Theoretically, if
a statute constitutes a taking and is unclear regarding Congress’s intent to provide
compensation, a plaintiff must first seek compensation from the Court of Federal Claims.
See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990). However, the Supreme Court has
recognized that, in situations wherein it would be a practical impossibility for the federal
government to compensate, it can be presumed that Congress did not intend to provide
compensation. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 520–22. This must be the case in the context
of an elimination of patent rights, which would require Congress to compensate for each
incident of infringement in many separate, continuing actions; injunctive relief is the only
realistic solution.
375
The Supreme Court has even noted that legislative decisions that affect property are
presumed to be prospective unless they are specifically noted to apply retroactively. See,
e.g., United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) (“The principle that
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is
familiar to every law student.”).
376
For example, the law limiting medical practitioner liability states that it applies only
to patents issuing on applications filed after the enactment date of the statute, September
1996. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(4) (2000). This is probably a bit of overkill, as patents become
property rights only upon issuance, not application.
377
See also Mossinghoff, supra note 28, at 193 (chart using data from PhRMA
depicting a typical timeline for the development of a new drug wherein patent rights are
obtained ten years before the drug is approved).
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rules. Thus, such a provision would not benefit consumers in the
near future.
2. Legislative Initiatives Will Not Pass Muster Unless Diluted
to Ineffectiveness
A legislative effort to open the borders to pharmaceutical
importation is not merely hypothetical; at least six bills introduced
in the 109th Congress seek to do so primarily by revising the
FDA’s regulatory and oversight mission.378 One of the most
interesting of these legislative initiatives is the Pharmaceutical
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005 (hereinafter
“PMADSA”).379 The bill, sponsored by Senator Byron Dorgan
and co-sponsored by a large, bi-partisan group of senators,380 is
notable in that it tackles many of the most difficult issues involved
in creating an effective importation system, going quite far in its
impact on established property rights. For example, the PMADSA
would have explicitly created an international exhaustion rule that
is specific to pharmaceuticals:
(f) EXHAUSTION(1) IN GENERAL- Section 271 of title 35, United
States Code, is amended—
(A) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as (i)
and (j), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
(h) It shall not be an act of infringement to use,
offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
to import into the United States any patented
invention under section 804 of the Federal Food,
378

See, e.g., Affordable Health Care Act, S. 16, 109th Cong.; Prescription Drug
Affordability Act, H.R. 578, 109th Cong; Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005, S.
109, 109th Cong.; Safe IMPORT Act of 2005, S. 184, 109th Cong.; Pharmaceutical
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, 109th Cong.; Prescription Drug
Affordability Act of 2005, H.R. 563, 109th Cong.
379
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, 109th Cong.
380
See id. at 1 (listing co-sponsors such as Senators Trent Lott, Edward Kennedy and
John McCain).
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act that was first sold
abroad by or under authority of the owner or
licensee of such patent.381
In doing so, the bill implicitly recognizes the existence of a
national exhaustion rule for all other patented inventions and that a
change to the Patent Act is required for a pharmaceutical
importation plan to be effective.382 The PMADSA also contains
numerous provisions to address safety concerns and the proper role
of the FDA in overseeing imports.
It is significant from the perspective of constitutional
protections for patent rights that the bill contains no statement that
the Patent Act revision is to apply prospectively, nor does it
suggest that rights are not harmed.383 Additionally, it does not
provide a compensation mechanism for patent rights taken by
eminent domain. Thus, this provision appears to be a relatively
clear unconstitutional legislative taking of property.
As with many of the other bills currently pending, the
PMADSA is a reincarnation of a bill originally introduced during
the 108th Congress. Interestingly, the part of the former
PMADSA384 that received the most attention with respect to
property rights was a section that would prohibit any attempt to
restrict or deny supplies of drugs to registered exporters who
import back into the United States.385 The same language exists in

381

Id. § 4(d) (emphasis added).
At least two other bills contain almost identical language: Affordable Health Care
Act, S. 16, 109th Cong.; Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005, S. 109, 109th Cong.
383
The bill does state that “[n]othing in the amendment made by [the paragraph revising
the patent importation right] shall be construed to affect the ability of a patent owner or
licensee to enforce their patent, subject to such amendment.” Pharmaceutical Market
Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, §4(d) 109th Cong. This obviously does not
account for the harm to the rights taken by the amendment.
384
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th Cong.
385
See Key Differences Between Kennedy-Dorgan & Gregg-Smith-Collins, available at
http://www.appwp.org/documents/safe_import_gregg-v-dorgan.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2005) (This document, which appeared on Senator Judd Gregg’s Website for several
weeks in 2004, states that S. 2328 requires drug manufacturers to sell unlimited quantities
of their drugs to foreign retailers at whatever price that foreign country stipulates, likely
violating both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Patent Clause of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution.).
382
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the current bill.386 The reason for the provision was the fear that
pharmaceutical companies would respond to an importation system
by simply restricting the quantity of drugs that are exported to
foreign countries to ensure an excess is not available for reimportation.387 Arguably, it would also constitute a taking in that
it apparently compels pharmaceutical companies to make and sell
whatever quantities of drugs are requested by licensed exporters.388
Such forced sales could be constitutional if initiated as a remedial
measure to a finding of illegal activity, such as a violation of the
antitrust laws.389 However, no such finding has been made with
respect to international sales that would apply to the entire
pharmaceutical industry. Thus, it is doubtful that this provision
also would pass constitutional muster.
For the reasons identified above, the PMADSA will likely be
quite controversial. Competing bills that are less stringent (and
more industry friendly) have been proposed,390 and are likely to be
proposed in the future. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that any
compromise in approach will be both effective and constitutional.
Anything less than a reduction of established patent rights will give
branded pharmaceutical manufacturers the power to eliminate the
benefits of any importation program. If there is any last hope
among public policy advocates that these issues can be resolved
without engaging pharmaceutical companies in negotiation, it is
through legal revision by the courts.

386

Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334, § 4(a), 109th
Cong.
387
See 150 Cong. Rec. S4229 (2004) (“Our legislation also includes strict rules to close
the loopholes that drug companies may use to evade the law.”) (statement of Senator
Kennedy).
388
See Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. 2328, 108th
Cong. § 27(a).
389
See, e.g., Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373 (1975) (ordering compulsory licenses for
patents relating to office copiers).
390
See, e.g., Safe IMPORT Act of 2005, S. 184, 109th Cong. It is a reincarnation of a
bill introduced by Senator Judd Gregg in July of 2004, the Safe IMPORT Act of 2004, S.
2493, 108th Cong., apparently in response to Senator Dorgan’s S. 2328.
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B. Rewriting the Rules through the Courts: An Exception to
Constitutional Protections
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of eminent domain law is
that the incredibly high constitutional hurdles that exist for the
legislature are entirely absent when legal rules are changed by the
courts. If a court decides to make a change to a common law rule
that has a retroactive effect on existing property rights, no Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment concerns arise.391 While the Supreme
Court has toyed with the idea that new principles of law should be
interpreted to apply prospectively only,392 that view has been
rejected in recent decisions.393 In light of this, it would appear that
the Jazz Photo decision, the platform upon which so much of the
controversy regarding importation and intellectual property rights
rests, could be revised far more easily and with fewer implications
than an act of Congress.394
To overrule Jazz Photo, another case and controversy
obviously must arise, as certiorari has long been denied in that
case.395 Even if this were to occur, to be effective, the decision

391

The just compensation clause has never been applied to judicial decision making. See
Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the Prospective
Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote
Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 21 n.75 (2003) (noting this fact and the likely
rationale).
392
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (“We should not indulge in
the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those
who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.”) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)).
393
See Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993):
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is
the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive
effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.
The notion that a court could avoid Harper by fashioning a remedy that essentially
rendered it ineffective to all but prospective cases was rejected in Reynoldsville Casket
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995).
394
However, a revision of Jazz Photo would have a much greater economic effect, as it
would affect patent rights in all industries, as opposed to being restricted to the
pharmaceutical industry as in S. 2328.
395
See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 U.S. 950 (2002). As noted
previously, this assumes that the decision in Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp.,
394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), is merely a clarification of the earlier opinion.
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must either be made by an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit396
or appeal of a three-judge-panel decision to the Supreme Court.
While the Federal Circuit has been willing to make decisions en
banc from time to time, they are relatively rare events. The
Supreme Court, for its part, has generally allowed the Federal
Circuit to operate on its own as the expert specialty court on patent
law.397 The Court has been known to step in on occasions when
the patent bar is particularly distressed about a ruling that has a
particularly strong negative effect on patent rights.398 In the case
of the exhaustion doctrine after Jazz Photo, however, no such
outrage was evident (presumably because it is said to favor patent
owners) and the case became dormant. It could be some time
before another exhaustion case arises in the context of a typical
patent infringement case.
On the other hand, if a patent provision like that in S. 334399 is
enacted, it is possible that the issue will emerge in the course of a
constitutional challenge to the statute by the owner of a
pharmaceutical-related patent. Regardless of whether the case is
initiated in federal or state court as described above, the issue of
the proper boundaries of the patent right could eventually be
addressed by the Supreme Court.400 The fact that an international
exhaustion rule exists in other countries could influence certain
members of the Court who have voiced an interest in looking to

396

An en banc panel of the Federal Circuit is required to change the precedent set forth
by a three-judge panel. A subsequent three-judge-panel decision that differs is not
binding on a subsequent panel or lower court. See Newell Cos. v. Kenny Mfg. Co. 864
F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a
panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned
in banc.”).
397
See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (2001).
398
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). Over thirty-five amicus briefs
were filed in the appeal before the Supreme Court. See Festo, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No.
00-1543).
399
See supra notes 379–89 and accompanying text.
400
In a takings case, one of the predicate issues a court must address is the scope and
validity of the property right. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946)
(determining the boundaries of air rights associated with land in the modern world).
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approach of other nations in forming legal doctrine.401 And given
the pharmaceutical industry’s current status in the public eye—
which appears on-par with tobacco companies—the Jazz Photo
rule could be ripe for reversal. However, such a decision could be
years in the future.
CONCLUSION
The preceding sections detail the conflict between health policy
and patent property rights and note the legal obstacles that exist for
pharmaceutical importation plans which envelope acts of
infringement. A broad consideration of relatively novel Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment-based arguments suggests that there is no
easy way to escape the protections accorded established property
rights by the Constitution without creating special rules. If the law
is straightforwardly enforced, unauthorized importers of patented
pharmaceuticals will face liability under the Constitution even if
there is immunity from prosecution under the Patent Act. This
suggests that almost impenetrable barriers exist for importation
initiatives. One might ask if this is really the proper result. From a
philosophical standpoint, will we accept intellectual property rights
that are so strong? The visceral issues in the drug import context
provide a good test of society’s convictions.
There are of course important reasons for granting full property
rights for the creation of desirable information—principally, to
create an incentive to invest money and effort.402 However, lesser
powers could be recognized for intangibles while still providing
some incentives. For example, if infringement of intellectual
401

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 573 (2003) (looking to a decision by the
European Court of Justice on the validity of laws prohibiting consensual homosexual
conduct).
402
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics
of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993–95 (1997) (“In a
private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation unless the
expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so—that is, unless they can
reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”).
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property were determined to be wholly distinct from eminent
domain takings of the same property, thus removing the
constitutional remedies, a less potent property right would result.
Such a regime would, in essence, create a second-class form of
property for patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets.
Though permissible under the law (assuming the legal revision is
made by courts), there could be an economic cost. Each “stick”
that one removes from the property bundle reduces the value of the
whole to some extent;403 at some point, if enough sticks are
disregarded, a few investors may be dissuaded and their
innovations may never come to fruition.404 This is especially
significant where the innovations in question are directly
applicable to health and safety problems.405
In addition to economic incentives, there are public policy
reasons for limiting the power of the government in its interactions
with private property in the stream of commerce. In a market
economy, government use of eminent domain power to control
supply and demand in the market place would be an abuse of
power if the government were not forced to fully compensate the
injured party. Commentators have recognized that this power is

403

See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing the
harm when a property owner loses “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others”).
404
See, e.g., Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection
Spur Technological Change? 18 (June 2001) (Center Discussion Paper No. 831
(unpublished), Economic Growth Center, Yale University) (concluding that intellectual
property protection has a strong positive association with research and development
investment), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm.
One
measure of the success of a patent system is the number of innovations it induces over the
number that would have existed anyway. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004) (using “high quality patents” as an assessment criteria and stating that “[p]atents on
known or only trivially modified inventions would confer potential market power . . .
without providing incentives for making genuine advances or disclosing such advances to
the public”), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html.
405
See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare and Health
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 247–50 (1999) (asserting that
a legal change that allows parallel importation of pharmaceuticals will have a negative
effect on research and development).
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purposely limited to resolving the holdout problem.406 Eminent
domain law ensures that the public costs are not borne solely by a
few private property owners.
Of course, whether this private property-based model is the
only one capable of producing the optimal amount of innovation is
a fair question. The model seems primed for conflict, as it
suggests that more income is always necessary for producing more
innovation. Any reduction in income could result in fewer
important treatments in the future than would otherwise be
discovered.407 In the context of pharmaceuticals, research suggests
that the pressures on the system are only likely to increase because
the return on research and development investment appears to be
decreasing.408 Other methods of encouraging innovation have
been suggested,409 and some already run in parallel with the
406

See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 138 (1997) (reviewing several
theories regarding the rationale for eminent domain power and concluding that “[t]he
justification for eminent domain, then, is the need to prevent hold-outs, which is a form
of transaction costs”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58–59
(4th ed. 1992); B. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 64,
64–86 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711–12 (1985).
Theoretically, a legitimate public use of the taken property must also be shown, but
courts have relaxed this requirement significantly. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain
power is equated with the police power. But the Court in Berman made clear that it is ‘an
extremely narrow’ one. . . .”) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). But see
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782–88 (Mich. 2004) (overruling the
decision in Poletown Neigh. Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), and
finding that, under the Michigan Constitution, a public use must be found in the
condemnation itself).
407
See PhRMA, supra note 41, at 1 (arguing that “[i]f we focus too much on cutting the
costs of medicines, we may lose sight of their value and we may jeopardize the value of
pharmaceuticals that could be developed in the future”).
408
See DiMasi et al., supra note 42, at 154 fig.1 (demonstrating that the discovery of
new chemical entities does not appear to be increasing at the same rate as R&D
expenditure).
409
See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (proposing a system wherein property rights for
important innovations are purchased by the public and freely available for developmental
research). But see Michael Abramowicz, Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 170–71
(2003) (introducing a detailed discussion as to why such “patent prize” systems are
inherently flawed).
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current intellectual property system.410 Though they may not
render the concept of intellectual property obsolete in the near
future, such alternatives may provide a measure of relief in areas of
great tension like health care.
For the immediate future, it is important to note that protecting
patent property rights and providing effective health care (or any
other public service) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There
are other methods for allocating resources that do not depend on
rewriting property rules. Three intelligent steps toward resolving
the health care crisis in this manner include: (1) using the
negotiating power of government entities and large private
purchasers (such as insurers) to extract lower prices; (2)
undertaking and reporting rational assessments of the effectiveness
of new medicines to enable purchasers to decide which new,
patented products are worth high prices; and (3) providing the
public with an honest assessment of the trade-offs that must be
made when the best health care is limited by economic realities. In
view of the barriers to pharmaceutical importation composed of
patent fences supported by durable constitutional fence posts,
elected officials would be wise to consider the alternatives before
setting out on a journey that is likely to end in public
disenchantment.

410

See, e.g., David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 241, 287–88 (2001) (describing the interaction between the tenets of the open
source software movement and copyright intellectual property law).

